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NOTE
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1985
The nineteenth year of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1
witnessed a number of developments the net result of which is that public
access to government information has been further curtailed. 2 In the leg-
islative arena, Congress continued to debate whether the FOIA should be
extensively amended, particularly in two areas-fees and waivers, 3 and
business information. 4 The President's Commission on Industrial Com-
petitiveness issued a report indicating that the FOIA's furtherance of
open access to business information substantially inhibited competition.5
In response, Congress enacted a statute that exempts information per-
taining to certain types of research and development projects. 6 Congress
also responded to obstacles in the dissemination of government informa-
tion by subjecting the National Endowment for Democracy to the
FOIA's disclosure provisions.7 In other activity, Congress considered
amendments to counter the inhibiting effects of the 1984 computer crime
legislation 8 on FOIA-mandated disclosure and to remedy the delays en-
countered by those seeking records from the Consumer Products Safety
Commission.9
The most significant administrative development affecting the FOIA
in 1985 was the publication of a proposed circular by the Office of Man-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. The recent trend toward restricting public access to government information is recognized
in Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 742 [hereinaf-
ter Note, Developments-1984]. For a discussion of developments under the FOIA in prior years,
see the annual FOIA note in the Duke Law Journal from 1970 to 1984.
3. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION:
THE NEW REALITY 25 (1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS]. See in-
fra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
6. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815. See infra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
7. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93,
§ 210(a), 99 Stat. 405, 432 (1985) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 4415 (1982)). See infra notes 34-44 and
accompanying text.
8. S. 610, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2729 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985). See infra
notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
9. H.R. 2630, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
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agement and Budget (OMB).' 0 The circular seeks, among other things,
to limit the amount of information that agencies provide on their own
initiative-without FOIA requests-as part of a cost-effective policy of
placing "maximum reliance on the private sector" for disseminating gov-
ernment information." Other efforts of the OMB in 1985 were calcu-
lated to clarify the responsibilities of agencies under the Privacy Act.' 2
In other administrative activity, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) responded to public criticism by amending its policy of requiring
full payment of charges before processing FOIA requests. 13
It was the activity of the federal courts that most severely limited
the sweep of the FOIA in 1985. The Council of Economic Advisers was
excluded from FOIA coverage.' 4 In the troublesome area of national
security, the Supreme Court interpreted the National Security Act of
1947 to give the CIA wide-ranging authority to withhold information. 15
The lower federal courts also indicated a willingness to expand exemp-
tions dealing with confidential and privileged business information; as a
result, the amount of information that will be available to the public is
likely to diminish. 16
The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in United States v. Weber Air-
craft 17 continued to be significant in 1985. In the exemption 4 context,
Weber Aircraft was broadly read by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.' 8 Under exemption 5, however, Weber Aircraft
was less generously received by two lower federal courts.' 9
Reverse-FOIA litigation in 1985 raised a variety of issues. In an
interesting case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, former President Nixon successfully enjoined
the disclosure of certain Watergate transcripts.20 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the disclosure of
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,734 (1985).
11. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
13. 50 Fed. Reg. 32,950 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.120). See infra notes 128-44
and accompanying text.
14. Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See
infra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
15. CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881, 1887 (1985). See infra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
17. 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
18. Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 603 F. Supp. 235 (D.D.C.
1985). See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
19. Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1985);
NAACP Legal Defense Fund v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985).
See infra notes 223-52 and accompanying text.
20. Ricchio v. Kline, 773 F.2d 1389, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See infra notes 262-74 and accom-
panying text.
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some types of information may be permitted under the Privacy Act's ex-
ception for material falling within the FOIA's mandatory disclosure pro-
visions, 21 even in the absence of a formal FOIA request.22
As in preceding years, 23 agency withholding under exemption 7(D)
received favorable judicial treatment in 1985, with one circuit court of
appeals holding that personnel of the withholding agency may be consid-
ered "confidential sources." 24 Another circuit rejected the "potential
witness rule" and held that those who provide information to an agency
may receive "confidential source" status even if they are potential wit-
nesses in subsequent agency proceedings.25 Finally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit distinguished between solicited
and unsolicited information obtained by an agency, and applied a differ-
ent standard of confidentiality to each of the two categories. 26
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Research and Development Exemption 3 Statute.
Near the end of the ninety-eighth Congress, the National Coopera-
tive Research Act of 1984 (the "Research Act") was passed; the law
qualifies as an exemption 3 statute under the FOIA.27 The Research Act
was designed to encourage joint research and development projects by
limiting antitrust liability for companies that notify the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Attorney General about planned joint
projects.2 The law requires a party seeking protection to file simultane-
ously with the FTC and the Attorney General a written notification of
the identities of any parties to the joint venture and of the venture's na-
ture and objectives.29
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982).
22. Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 275-89 and
accompanying text.
23. See Note, Developments-1984, supra note 2, at 769-74.
24. Kuzma v. IRS, 775 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). See infra notes 294-309 and
accompanying text.
25. United Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1985). See infra notes 310-
17 and accompanying text.
26. Brant Constr. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 318-30
and accompanying text.
27. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815. For a
discussion of the legislation that predates its enactment, see Note, Developments-1984, supra note
2, at 758-59.
28. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-21, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3131, 3140-46.
29. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 1815,
1818. After receiving this information, the Commission or Attorney General is to publish a notice
thereof in the Federal Register. Id. § 6(b), 98 Stat. at 1818. The law limits the potential antitrust
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Most significantly, the new law mandates nondisclosure by the FTC
of information submitted pursuant to its terms, even if a request is made
under the FOIA.30 This provision is an adaptation of the House version
of the bill, which gave no discretion to the FTC or the Attorney General
to disclose such information.31 As an exemption 3 statute,32 the Re-
search Act does not permit any agency discretion regarding disclosure. 33
B. National Endowment for Democracy.
In 1985, both houses of Congress moved to amend the State Depart-
ment Authorization Bill34 to require the National Endowment for De-
mocracy (NED) to disclose information not exempt under FOIA.35 The
House and Senate versions differed. The House bill did not formally
bring the NED under the scope of the FOIA; thus, it was unclear
whether denials of requested information would be reviewable in federal
district courts, and, if so, whether review would be de novo, as it is when
an agency is formally governed by the FOIA.36 The Senate version made
liability of a party complying with its notification provisions to actual, as opposed to treble, damages.
Id. § 4, 98 Stat. at 1816-17.
30. Id. § 6(d), 98 Stat. at 1818.
31. H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEvs 3131, 3145. The Senate version would not have made nondisclosure mandatory; it would
have given the Attorney General or the FTC authority to disclose the information even when a
business had requested that the information not be released. See S. 1841, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 204(c), reprinted in S. REp. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984).
The Conference Report specifically rejected the Senate approach, emphasizing that "[t]he At-
torney General and Federal Trade Commission do not have discretion to release to the public any of
the information relating to the joint venture, except for publication under subsection (b), whether or
not it is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act." H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3131, 3145.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982) states that the FOIA shall not apply to matters that are "specif-
ically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3131, 3145.
34. The bill has been enacted into law. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405 (1985).
35. The NED is a quasi-private group that receives government funds. Until this legislation
was enacted, the FOIA did not apply to the NED. See 131 CONG. Rc. H3079 (daily ed. May 9,
1985) (remarks of Rep. McCain in offering the amendment).
36. Public Access to Information Held by Government-Funded Group Approved by House, 11
AccEss REPORTS No. 11, May 22, 1985, at 4-5.
The sponsor of the House amendment stated that "[t]his amendment recognizes the valid con-
cerns of those who feel that the National Endowment for Democracy is a private organization and
should not be covered by the FOIA." 131 CONG. REc. H3079 (daily ed. May 9, 1985) (remarks of
Rep. McCain). The House amendment calls for review to be conducted by the general counsel of the
NED. Id.
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the NED formally subject to the FOIA,37 thus allowing an unsuccessful
FOIA requester to bring suit against the NED for disclosure, and sub-
jecting the NED's decision to de novo review.38 Although the sponsors
of the Senate bill would have preferred to abolish the NED, 39 they of-
fered this bill as a means of curtailing the organization's autonomy by
making information concerning the group's activities and expenditures
available to the public."'
The conference committee resolved the dispute in favor of the Sen-
ate version,41 the conference report stating that the NED must hence-
forth "fully comply with the provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act,"' 42 and the bill subsequently became law.43 The new legislation also
makes the United States Information Agency (USIA) responsible for
FOIA actions brought against the NED.44
37. S. 1003, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403, 131 CONG. REc. S7798 (daily ed. June 7, 1985).
38. Id (NED required to "fully comply" with FOIA).
39. 131 CONG. REC. S7798 (daily ed. June 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Zorinsky).
40. Id. at S7799. Senators Weicker and Zorinsky argued that full disclosure and accountability
would help keep the public informed of how its tax dollars were spent. Id.
41. H.R. REP. No. 240, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. H6812, H6834
(daily ed. July 30, 1985).
The conference committee agreed on the following language:
(a) COMPLIANCE wITH THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT - Notwithstanding
the fact that the Endowment is not an agency or establishment of the United States Gov-
ernment, the Endowment shall fully comply with all of the provisions of section 552 of title
4, United States Code.
(b) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGITR -... [T]he Endowment shall make avail-
able to the Director of the United States Information Agency such records and other infor-
mation as the Director determines may be necessary for such purposes. The Director shall
cause such records and other information to be published in the Federal Register.
(c) REVIEW BY USIA - (1) In the event that the Endowment determines not to
comply with a request for records under section 552, the Endowment shall submit a report
to the Director of the United States Information Agency explaining the reasons for not
complying with such request.
(2) If the Director approves the determination not to comply with such request, the
United States Information Agency shall assume full responsibility, including financial re-
sponsibility, for defending the Endowment in any litigation relating to such request.
(3) If the Director disapproves the determination not to comply with such request,
the Endowment shall comply with such request.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 210, 99
Stat. 405, 432 (1985).
42. H.R. REP. No. 240, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 79, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. H6812, H6834
(daily ed. July 30, 1985).
43. See supra note 34.
44. H.R. REP. No. 240, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. H6812, H6834
(daily ed. July 30, 1985). The conference report noted that an individual may make a FOIA request
either to the NED or the USIA. Id.
Another, more minor, provision affecting the FOIA was attached to the State Department Au-
thorization Bill. Congress exempted from FOIA disclosure all records pertaining to arbitration
claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Id. at 36, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. at
H6822. The bill states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as
the Freedom of Information Act), records pertaining to the arbitration of claims before the
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C. Computer Crime Legislation.
The provision commonly known as the "Computer Crime Law" was
enacted in the final days of the ninety-eighth Congress.45 The provision
prohibits unauthorized accessing and disclosure of data stored in govern-
ment-operated computers.46 Critics of the Computer Crime Law fear
that it may discourage government workers from fulfilling FOIA re-
quests for information stored in government computers.47 In response to
this concern, the Senate considered a bill to amend the Computer Crime
Law.48 The amendment would apply a penalty only to one who know-
ingly "uses or discloses individually identifiable information in such [a]
computer, the disclosure of which is prohibited by section 552 a(i) of title
5 [the Privacy Act]."'49
Senator Mathias, a sponsor of the bill, argued that the Computer
Crime Law sweeps too broadly, stating:
The Freedom of Information Act... expresses the principle that all
government information ought to be readily available to the American
people, subject only to the specific exceptions contained in the FOIA
or other applicable statutes. But [the Computer Crime Law] seems to
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal may not be disclosed to the general public, except
that-
(1) rules, awards, and other decisions of the Tribunal and claims and responsive
pleadings filed at the Tribunal by the United States on its own behalf shall be made avail-
able to the public, unless the Secretary of State determines that public disclosure would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States or United States claimants in proceedings
before the Tribunal, or that public disclosure would be contrary to the rules of the Tribu-
nal; and
(2) the Secretary of State may determine on a case-by-case basis to make such infor-
mation available when in the judgment of the Secretary the interests of justice so require.
Id. Subsection (1) of the amendment, by allowing disclosure of information concerning some claims
filed by or on behalf of the United States, implies that the general nondisclosure requirement is
designed to protect the records of private claims.
45. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 2102, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-91 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
46. The law calls for punishment of one who
knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such au-
thorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, de-
stroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such
computer is operated for or on behalf of the Government of the United States and such
conduct affects such operation.
Id.
47. Senators Introduce Amendment to Limit Computer Crime Bill, 11 ACcEss REPORTS No. 6,
Mar. 13, 1985, at 4.
48. S. 610, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S2729 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985).
49. Id. The Privacy Act limitation would apply only to "use or disclosure" of information; one
who modifies, destroys, or prevents the use of information in a computer would be subject to punish-
ment without regard to the Privacy Act. The reason for this distinction is that conduct that modi-
fies, destroys, or prevents the use of computerized information is similar to a trespass at common law
and does not significantly implicate first amendment rights. 131 CONG. Rac. S2730 (daily ed. Mar.
7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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apply even if the FOIA mandates that the information be disclosed
upon proper request. As a result, information to which the public has
an unfettered right to access may not be released by the government
employee whose authority to obtain it from a computerized file is in
doubt.50
Such concern is well-founded. Individual federal employees initially de-
cide whether to disclose particular documents pursuant to FOIA re-
quests.51 An employee who faces possible prosecution and imprisonment
for a mistake in asserting his authority will be likely to resolve any doubt
in favor of nondisclosure.5 2 This amendment would give the employee
guidelines for making a decision; unauthorized use or disclosure of com-
puterized information would be prohibited only where such disclosure is
prohibited by the Privacy Act. 53
D. Freedom of Information Reform Act.
On the first day of the first session of the ninety-ninth Congress Sen-
ator Hatch resubmitted his Freedom of Information Reform Act.54 Un-
daunted by the bill's death in the ninety-eighth Congress, Senator Hatch
was confident that major FOIA reform legislation would be enacted in
1985. 55 No major reform was enacted in 1985, though, and substantial
change in the FOIA in the near future appears unlikely. First, Glenn
English, the chairman of the House committee that deals with FOIA
50. 131 CONG. REc. 52728-29 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
51. Id. at S2729.
52. Id If Mathias is correct in his belief that the Computer Crime Law will encourage denials
of FOIA requests, such an increase in denials may well lead to more litigation and, thus, a greater
burden on the judiciary. As Mathias pointed out, "any prudent agency official would play it safe and
let the courts decide." Id.
The Senator is not alone in his fears. Even before the Computer Crime Law was passed in 1984,
an editorial in the New York Times speculated that the law would cut off access to much legitimately
available information simply because it was stored in computers. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1984, at A26,
col. 1. The editorial also expressed concern that "agencies bent on secrecy" could write regulations
calling for criminal sanctions for employees divulging even nonsensitive and unclassified informa-
tion. Id.
The Senate tried to respond to these concerns before final passage of the Computer Crime Law,
passing an amendment similar to S.610 by a wide margin. 130 CONG. REc. S14,247-48 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 1984). The House, however, adjourned without acting on the amendment. 131 CONG. REC.
S2729 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
53. 131 CONG. REc. S2730 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
54. S. 150, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 131 CONG. REc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). Hatch had
offered a very similar reform bill in the ninety-eighth Congress. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
That bill easily passed the Senate and received a full schedule of hearings before the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee, but never reached the House floor. For a discussion of S. 774 and its
legislative history, see Note, Developments-1984, supra note 2, at 744-53.
55. The Senator stated that his "meetings with the House subcommittee chairman in charge of
information policy [led him] to believe that the House will pass some FOIA reforms in this Con-
gress." 131 CONG. REC. 5263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
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legislation, does not "believe that the FOIA needs the major overhaul"
contemplated by Hatch,56 although he does admit the law should be fine-
tuned.5 7 Second, although Hatch's FOIA reform plan has been around
in some form since the ninety-seventh Congress, 5& it still has not gar-
nered House approval.
Senate action on the Hatch bill has been slow. Although Hatch has
indicated that he wants markup of the legislation to proceed quickly,59
the only action taken thus far has been the bill's approval, without
amendment, by the Senate Constitution Subcommittee in May, 1985.60
A separate bill to reform the FOIA was proposed in the House in
1985 by Representative English.61 Although the English bill differs from
the Hatch bill appreciably,62 both bills focus on the same areas for re-
form-fees and business information.
1. Fees and Waivers. The FOIA currently allows an agency to
recover only the "direct costs" of search and duplication; the agency has
discretion to waive or reduce the fee if the information would benefit not
only the requester but the general public.6 3 Senator Hatch contends that
the costs of search and duplication "are only a fraction of the true costs
of answering a FOIA request." 64 Hatch's bill would amend the fees sec-
tion of FOIA by allowing fee schedules to "provide for the payment of all
costs reasonably and directly attributable to responding to the request. '65
The bill has been criticized, however, for failing to suggest any standard
56. Washington Focus, 11 AccEss REFPORTS No. 2, Jan. 16, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Washington
Focus-Hatch].
57. Id.
58. See 131 CONG. REc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). See also Note, Developments-1984,
supra note 2, at 744-45; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1983, 1984
DUKE L.J. 377, 420 [hereinafter Note, Developments-1983 ]; Note, Developments Under the Free-
dom of Information Act-1982, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390, 392; Comment, Developments Under the Free-
dom of Information Act-1981, 1982 DUKE L.J. 423, 426.
59. Washington Focus-Hatch, supra note 56, at 1.
60. [1985-86] 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 21,002 (Jan. 24, 1986).
61. H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
62. Hatch has expressed wide-ranging concern with the way the FOIA works today, calling for
sharp cutbacks in the law. See 131 CONG. REc. S263-65 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). English, on the
other hand, has suggested that only minor reforms are necessary. See The Freedom ofInformation
Reform Act. Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice, and Agriculture
of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (statement of Rep. English, Chair-
man) (1985).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
64. 131 CONG. REC. S265 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch). The Senator went
on to note that actual FOIA costs were $60 million in 1980, as compared to original estimates of
$40,000 to $100,000 per year. Currently agencies collect only about two percent of actual costs. Id.
65. S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 131 CONG. Rc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). This sec-
tion defines "costs" as those for "services by agency personnel in search, duplication, and other
processing of the request." Id. (emphasis added).
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for determining the legitimate costs of review. Hearings conducted for S.
774 in the ninety-eighth Congress indicated that the administrative pro-
cess varies so widely from agency to agency, with varying fee rates and
items subject to charge, that the amendment would be difficult to apply.66
The English bill sets up a different fee regime, establishing three
levels of fees. A requester of records for commercial use would pay "fees
... limited to reasonable standard charges for document search, duplica-
tion, and review."' 67 When records are requested for noncommercial use,
the fee would be limited to reasonable standard duplication charges, 68
thus actually reducing the fee for such requests 69 as compared with the
present FOIA rules. For other types of requests, fees would be limited to
document search and duplication costs. 70 Thus, while the Hatch bill
would increase fees across the board by including review costs, the Eng-
lish bill would increase fees only for commercially valuable information
and would reduce fees for many other types of information by limiting
fees to duplication charges.
The English bill also proposes to expand the fee waiver provision, an
area not addressed at all by the Hatch bill. The current FOJA calls for a
waiver of all fees "where the agency determines that waiver or reduction
of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the information can
be considered as primarily benefiting the general public." 71 The English
bill would broaden the area of waiver by requiring waiver of fees if "dis-
closure of the information is likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not
primarily in the commercial interest of the requester; or... a requester is
indigent and can demonstrate a compelling need for the documents. '72
66. See The Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 932 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU) (1985).
67. H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985). This provision allows a charge for time spent
reviewing documents requested for a commercial purpose.
68. Id
69. For this limit to apply, the request must be made
by or on behalf of an individual, or an educational or noncommercial scientific institution,
whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research; a representative of the news media; or a
nonprofit group that intends to make the information available to the news media, any
branch or agency of Federal, State or local government, or the general public.
Id
70. Id.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
72. H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985). The proposed amendment also calls for fee
waiver where the costs of routine collection and processing of the fee are likely to equal or exceed the
amount of the fee, or if the request requires less than two hours of search time and involves copying
less than one hundred pages. Id.
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2. Business Confidentiality Procedures. Under the present FOIA,
a businessperson or other private party who submits information to a
government agency has no right to receive notice that those records have
been requested by a third party, nor a right to de novo federal court
review of a decision to release information over his or her objection.73
The Hatch and English bills both address this situation, and their re-
sponses are similar in several respects. Both establish procedures by
which a submitter of confidential business information would be required
to designate at the time of submission that the information is exempted
from mandatory disclosure by subsection (b)(4)74 of the FOIA.75 When
a request is made for such information, both bills would require that the
agency notify the submitter of the request.76 The submitter would then
be given an opportunity to object to disclosure, and the agency would be
required to inform the submitter of its final decision.77
The two bills differ, however, on the standards they propose for judi-
cial review of these disclosure decisions. The Hatch bill allows judicial
review of an agency decision to disclose confidential business records
against the wishes of a submitter, and provides that the court is to con-
sider the matter de novo.78 The Hatch bill would not alter the de novo
review standard that the FOIA currently applies to agency decisions not
to disclose. The English bill, in contrast, does not allow de novo review
of an agency decision to disclose information; where a submitter seeks to
enjoin the disclosure of information, judicial review would be limited to
the record of the agency decision. De novo review would still be re-
quired, however, when the agency decides to withhold information.7 9
73. 131 CONG. REc. S266 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
74. Exemption 4 states that "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential" are exempt from the FOIA's mandatory disclosure
provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
75. S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 131 CONG. Rac. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 1882,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985).
76. S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess § 4, 131 CONG. REc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 1882,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985).
77. S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 131 CONG. REc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) ("mhe
submitter may, within ten working days of the forwarding of such notification, submit to the agency
written objection to such disclosure." The agency then "shall notify the submitter of any final deci-
sion regarding the release of such information.").
The language of H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985), is similar, except that "the agency
shall determine, within ten working days of the date when the submitter's objections are due,
whether to comply with the request and shall notify the submitter of any final decision regarding the
release of such information."
78. S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 131 CONG. REc. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
79. H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1985). The bill provides that "[i]n any case to enjoin
the withholding or the disclosure of records... the court shall determine the matter de novo, except
that in a case to enjoin the disclosure of requested records, the court shall examine only the record of
the agency decision." Id. (emphasis added).
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There is a sound theoretical basis for the English bill's dichotomy.
When an agency decides to withhold information, there is a possibility
that the agency is acting in a self-interested manner. Thus, the higher
standard of review is appropriate where information is withheld. But
when the agency grants disclosure, it is unlikely to be acting out of self-
interest, and there is thus less need for judicial scrutiny.
E. Commission on Industrial Competitiveness Report.
The thirty-member Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, ap-
pointed by President Reagan in 1983, recently issued a report that points
to the FOIA as a cause of the loss of intellectual property by American
companies.80 The crux of the Commission's findings is that protection of
American technological innovation is crucial to protecting the country's
competitive position in the world economy. The report indicates that the
nation must develop a clear policy for protecting intellectual property
and protect that property from foreign expropriation to remain competi-
tive in world markets. 81 To combat foreign expropriation, "the United
States must continuously review the adequacy of its own laws in light of
the fast pace of technological advance and the rapidly increasing ability
of infringers to make copies."'82 The report argues that initiatives are
needed that "extend beyond the intellectual property system itself to
other Federal laws and practices that weaken the protection of intellec-
tual property rights."'8 3
Specifically, the report identifies a problem in the FOIA's protection
of trade secrets and business information. Because the FOIA is a com-
pulsory disclosure statute with discretionary exemptions, there is no
guarantee that a given exemption-such as that for trade secrets or other
confidential business information-will actually prevent disclosure.84
The report also lists several of what it considers serious problems with
the FOIA "as it applies to research-intensive, high-technology compa-
nies": (1) that foreign nationals are not barred from access altogether;
(2) that submitters of information are not notified prior to its release;
(3) that there is no private right of action to prevent disclosure (in con-
trast to the burdensome APA procedure); (4) that Congress has never
80. Presidential Commission Says FOIA has Contributed to Intellectual Property Loss, 11 Ac-
cEss REPORTS No. 5, Feb. 27, 1985, at 2.
81. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 304, 305, 312.
82. Id. at 313 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. The report indicates that the FOIA is one of these "other Federal laws." See Id. at 322-
24.
84. Id. at 323. The applicable section of the FOIA is exemption 4. For the text of that exemp-
tion, see supra note 74.
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defined "trade secrets" as used in exemption 4.85
The commission offers a number of remedies for these problems.
First, the report urges that "FOIA requests from foreign nationals, in-
cluding requests from U.S. agents on behalf of foreign clients, should be
barred. '8 6 While this recommendation may prevent some loss of Ameri-
can intellectual property, it appears to be overbroad. By completely ban-
ning foreign nationals from obtaining any government information under
the FOIA, the proposal goes beyond its announced goal of protecting
American trade secrets.
Second, the report recommends that a notification procedure be es-
tablished, placing submitters of trade secrets on a more equal footing
with requesters.8 7 The commission suggests that submitters of trade
secrets be allowed to claim confidentiality and to oppose disclosure in
hearings before the agency.88 Once an agency makes a final decision re-
garding release of information under a FOIA request, the submitter
should be notified of the decision before the information is released.8 9
The commission also recommends an amendment to FOIA to allow sub-
mitters to bring an action to enjoin release of confidential business
information.90
Finally, the report urges clarification of the terms "trade secrets"
and "confidential commercial or financial information." Such clarifica-
tion, the commission argues, is necessary if exemption 4 and the Trade
Secrets Act91 are to have any teeth in protecting trade secrets.92
F. Consumer Product Safety Commission Legislation.
In 1985, an effort was made in the House to reduce the backlog of
FOIA requests at the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) by
85. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 323-24.
86. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 324. Any attempt to limit
foreign requesters' access to government information about themselves would be likely to face oppo-
sition in Congress. There is also fear that such a law could cause a backlash against American access
to information held by foreign governments. See H.R. REP. No. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33
(1983).
87. This is the position taken in both of the current FOIA reform bills. See supra notes 73-79
and accompanying text.
88. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 324.
89. Id.
90. Id. The report does not specifically mention whether its authors prefer de novo review, as
the Hatch bill does, see supra note 78 and accompanying text, or review limited to the agency
record, as the English bill recommends, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982).
92. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 324. Neither the Senate nor
the House FOIA reform defines those terms.
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amending the public disclosure section of the CPSC authorizing statute93
to facilitate CPSC response to FOIA requests.94 Currently, the CPSC
must undertake a complex procedure each time it receives a FOIA re-
quest. First, the CPSC must send information that it intends to disclose,
but which would also reveal the identity of a manufacturer or labeler, to
that manufacturer or labeler.95 The Commission also must "take reason-
able steps to assure, prior to its public disclosure ... that information
from which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler may be
readily ascertained is accurate. ' 96 Should a manufacturer claim that the
information for proposed disclosure is inaccurate, the FOIA request can
be delayed for months. 97
The proposed amendment would repeal that part of the authorizing
statute that requires the Commission to offer the manufacturer an oppor-
tunity to mark information "confidential" and thus preclude disclosure. 98
The amendment substitutes a requirement that the CPSC mark each doc-
ument released with a statement that such document has not been re-
viewed for accuracy. 99
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1982). The applicable regulations are found at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1101.1-.71
(1985).
94. H.R. 2630, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1985).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1982).
96. .id
97. House Panel to Consider Bill to Ease CPSC Backlog of FOA Requests, 1I AccEss REPORTS
No. 12, June 5, 1985, at 2, 3 [hereinafter CPSC Backlog].
98. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(3) (1982), the subject of the repeal effort, states:
The Commission shall, prior to the disclosure of any information which will permit the
public to ascertain readily the identity of a manufacturer or private labeler of a consumer
product, offer such manufacturer or private labeler an opportunity to mark such informa-
tion as confidential and therefore barred from disclosure under paragraph (2) [paragraph 2
requires that information that contains or relates to a trade secret is to be considered confi-
dential and not to be disclosed].
Even under this law, a document designated as confidential by the manufacturer can be disclosed by
the CPSC if "the Commission determines [that such information] may be disclosed because it is not
confidential information as provided in paragraph (2)." 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(5) (1982). The Com-
mission must, however, notify the submitter that it intends to disclose the document. Id. The sub-
mitter may, before the proposed date of disclosure, bring an action in federal court to stay disclosure
of the document. Id § 2055(a)(6). No disclosure shall be made until the court has ruled on the
motion to stay. Id.
99. The proposed section reads as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), in responding to requests for information which were
made under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the Commission shall mark, in a
prominent place, each document to be released pursuant to such a request with the follow-
ing statement: "This Document has been Released by the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Requirements of Title 5 and It has not
been Reviewed for Accuracy for the Purpose of Your Request."
H.R. 2630, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(d) (1985).
The current regulations outline reasonable steps for the CPSC to take to assure the accuracy of
information prior to release. 16 C.F.R. § 1101.32 (1985). Such steps would of course become un-
necessary should the proposed amendment pass.
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The amendment is aimed at reducing the time it takes for the CPSC
to process FOIA requests. Before the present procedures were estab-
lished, the CPSC was able to process eighty percent of its FOIA requests
within ten days and one hundred percent within thirty days. 1°° Under
the present procedures, the CPSC processes onlysixty percent within ten
days, and it occasionally takes months or years to process some of the
remaining forty percent.101
Scheduled markup sessions for the proposal were twice delayed by
the subcommittee overseeing the bill.10 2 That subcommittee approved a
clean version of the bill on September 19, 1985.103
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Office of Management and Budget.
1. Management of Federal Information. In March, 1985, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a proposed circular on
management of federal information services 0 4 that seeks to curtail infor-
mation availability sharply. The proposed circular has two main themes:
first, that by requiring public access to information, federal law only re-
quires agencies to release information that is the subject of valid requests;
and second, that information should be disseminated in the most cost-
effective manner with "maximum reliance on the private sector."10 5 The
100. CPSC Backlog, supra note 97, at 3.
101. Id. (quoting Robert Adler, counsel to the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House
Energy and Commerce Comm.).
The CPSC recently promulgated a final rule concerning appeals of Commission denials of
FOIA requests. 50 Fed. Reg. 7753 (1985) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1015.7). This new rule
provides that requesters may appeal denials of FOIA requests to the General Counsel of the CPSC,
instead of to the Commission, and the decisions of the General Counsel will constitute final agency
action. Id. at 7753-54. The Commission did not specifically indicate whether this new procedure
was designed to reduce the request backlog.
102. Washington Focus, 11 AccEss REPORTS No. 13, June 19, 1985, at 1.
103. [1985-86] 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 35,033 (Jan. 24, 1986).
104. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,734 (1985).
105. Id. at 10,735. The circular states:
The mere fact that an agency has created or collected information is not itself a valid
reason for creating a program to disseminate the information to the public. Agencies cre-
ate and collect much information ... that is not intended for dissemination, for which
there is no public demand, and the dissemination of which would serve no public purpose
and would not be cost-justified.... While such information may be subject to access upon
request under provisions of agency statutes, the Freedom of Information Act, or the Pri-
vacy Act, the agency must demonstrate in each case the need actively to disseminate such
information.
Id. (emphasis added). The circular later states:
When agencies have justified and made the basic decision to disseminate information, they
must also satisfy conditions regarding the manner of dissemination.... [A]gencies must
act in the most effective manner, which includes maximum reliance on the private sec-
tor.... It is "the general policy of the government to rely on commercial sources to supply
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circular also recommends increased use of advanced information tech-
nology, such as the use of computer and telecommunications systems. 106
The OMB proposal has received some negative comment. The
American Library Association (ALA) has charged that the circular seeks
to make access to government information so costly that many users will
be unable to afford it. 107 One of the ALA's concerns is that, while the
same amount of information will theoretically be available, public access
will be limited if government agencies are restricted in their active dis-
semination of the material. Such a policy would require the public to
submit FOIA requests for many kinds of information that the govern-
ment had actively supplied before-an expense that could force many
requesters out of the information market.108 The ALA is also critical of
the OMB's call for maximum reliance on the private sector for informa-
tion dissemination, claiming that this, too, will increase the price of infor-
mation for users. 10 9
The ALA also warned that the OMB's proposal for the use of ad-
vanced computer and telecommunications technologies for data collec-
tion, storage, retrieval, and dissemination would, if effected, diminish
public access to information by placing those who could not afford com-
puters or computer time at a disadvantage. 110 The ALA also criticized
the OMB for cutting agencies' budgets, effectively forcing agencies to cut
back on information publication programs, without any consideration by
the OMB of the information's value to the public or its role in fulfilling
"the agency's mission.""'
the products and services the government needs," including products and services the gov-
ernment needs in order to disseminate information to the public.
Id. Finally, the circular discusses user charges in certain situations:
The Federal Government is the sole possessor and supplier of certain types of information,
which is frequently of substantial commercial value. Dissemination of such information,
or its dissemination in a specific form or medium, may represent a government service from
which recipients derive special benefits [in which case user charges may be appropriate].
Id at 10,736.
106. Id. at 10,737-38.
107. Library Group Testifies Against Proposed OMB Approach to Information Management, II
AccEss REPORTS No. 10, May 8, 1985, at 7 [hereinafter Library Group].
108. Id. The expense of making a FOJA request can be great; the total cost includes the filing
fee, the opportunity costs associated with the time it takes to file a request, and the expense of
litigation if the request is denied. The ALA claims that recent increases in filing fees will aggravate
the problem. Id. at 7-8.
109. Id The group did not, however, specify why.
110. Id. at 8. This issue goes beyond questions of cost in light of the current law providing strict
penalties for government employees who improperly access computers-the Computer Crime Law.
See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. Because the Computer Crime Law may make it more
difficult for information stored in computers to be disclosed than other types of information, the
proposed increase in computerization would also lead to diminished public access to information.
111. Library Group, supra note 107, at 8. Such criticism may be well founded-some have
charged that the federal agencies are currently not following the FOIA's requirements for the publi-
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2. Privacy Act Guidance. In June, 1985, the OMB issued an advi-
sory memorandum offering federal agencies a survey of legislative and
judicial developments under the Privacy Act, 112 and specifically address-
ing three areas: the disclosure of Privacy Act material during litigation;
the disclosure, in the absence of a FOIA request, of Privacy Act material
subject to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA; and the relationship
between the Privacy Act and the FOIA.113
The first OMB concern-Privacy Act material used by an agency
during litigation-grew out of the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Krohn v. United States Department
of Justice that the "routine use" exception to the Privacy Act does not
include information used "during appropriate legal proceedings"-the
standard that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had adopted. 114
cation and availability of certain types of information. Representative Glenn English has asked the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate whether agencies are complying with subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the FOIA. See English Asks GAO to Look into Agency Compliance with FOIA's
Affirmative Disclosure Mandates, 11 Acc.ss REPORTS No. 1, Jan. 2, 1985, at 5.
The FOIA requires agencies to publish in the FederalRegister five types of information "for the
guidance of the public." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1982). This information includes descriptions of
agency organization, statements of the general course and method of agency functions, procedural
rules, substantive rules of general applicability, and any amendments or revisions of the above. Id.
Agencies are also required to make available three types of information for public inspection and
copying, including final opinions in adjudication of cases, statements of policy and interpretations
not published in the Federal Register, and administrative staff manuals that affect a member of the
public. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1982).
112. See OMB Issues New Privacy Act Guidance Reflecting Court Rulings and New Legislation,
11 AccEss REPoRTs No. 12, June 5, 1985, at 3-4 [hereinafter OMB Guidance].
The OMB was criticized in a report by the Committee for not taking an active enough role in
establishing privacy policy. See H.R. RP. No. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1983). The report
concluded that "interest in the Privacy Act at OMB has diminished steadily since 1975. Since issu-
ing extensive guidelines when the Privacy Act became effective, OMB has not actively pursued its
responsibility to revise and update that guidance." Idl at 2. The most significant criticism was that
"OMB's oversight is reactive to proposals for change made by agencies. OMB does not actively
supervise, review, or monitor agency compliance with Privacy Act guidelines." Id. Indeed, one
could argue that the latest OMB guidelines, see infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text, are pri-
marily reactive to legislative and judicial developments, and do not take an independent lead in
mapping out Privacy Act policy.
In response to this perceived inaction at OMB, Representative Glenn English has introduced a
bill to establish a Data Protection Board, which would assume OMB's oversight of the Privacy Act
and policy-making responsibilities. H.R. 1721, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also English In-
troduces Bill to Create Data Protection Board, 11 AccEss REPoRTS No. 7, Mar. 27, 1985, at 3-4.
The House has not acted on the bill.
113. OMB Guidance, supra note 112, at 3.
114. Krohn v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 78-1536, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. May 19, 1984).
The FBI had published a list of "routine uses," including "appropriate legal proceedings." Id. at 4-
5. The court concluded that the term "during appropriate legal proceedings" was too vague, noting
that if the FBI could disclose documents containing personal information protected by the Privacy
Act during FOIA-related or other litigation, the rights secured by the Privacy Act would be worth
little. Id. at 6-7.
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In response to Krohn, OMB now recommends that agencies adopt a
"routine use" definition that is narrow enough to avoid violating Krohn,
but not so limited as to restrict the flow of necessary and relevant infor-
mation during litigation. 115 Specifically, the OMB suggests that agencies
adopt standards allowing disclosure of any records subject to the Privacy
Act that are relevant to litigation to which the agency is a party or in
which it has an interest, so long as disclosure is compatible with the pur-
poses for which the records were originally collected.116
The OMB's concern with disclosure of Privacy Act material subject
to the FOIA was also triggered by a judicial decision. In Bartel v.
FAA, 117 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that an agency must have an actual FOIA request in hand before
disclosing information that is subject both to the Privacy Act and to the
FOIA118
A broad reading of Bartel could bar an agency's disclosure of "all
kinds of records traditionally treated as being in the public domain";1 19
as a result, the OMB gives Bartel a narrow reading. The OMB suggests
that agencies recognize a new category of records-those "traditionally
held to be in the public domain or which are required to be disclosed to
the public, such as many of the final orders and opinions of quasi-judicial
agencies, press releases, telephone directories, organizational charts,
etc." 120 Under the OMB's interpretation of Bartel, information in this
category would be subject to disclosure without a FOIA request. 12 1
OMB recommends that records falling outside of this category not be
disclosed absent an actual FOIA request.' 22
The OMB also advised agencies on the appropriate response to Con-
gress's 1984 legislation declaring that the Privacy Act is not an exemp-
tion 3 statute.12 3 Under the OMB's guidelines, agencies should base their
115. OMB Guidance, supra note 112, at 3-4.
116. Id. at 4. One may wonder whether the OMB guideline here is any less vague than the
standard struck down by Krohn. See supra note 114.
117. 725 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 1412. The Privacy Act bars disclosure of certain material unless that material is also
subject to the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982).
119. OMB Guidelines, supra note 112, at 4. The OMB listed as examples agency telephone di-
rectories compiled by personnel systems and press releases on employee accomplishments. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The OMB's list of subjects to include in this category does not indicate that the cate-
gory would be very broad.
122. Id.
123. OMB also advised federal agencies concerning the issue whether the Privacy Act is an
exemption 3 statute. This issue, which had been the subject of a split among the federal courts of
appeals, compare Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act
not an exemption 3 statute) with Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act is an
exemption 3 statute), was settled by legislation in 1984-Congress decided that the Privacy Act is
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disclosure decisions upon whichever authority the FOIA requester cites.
For example, if a party requests first-party information and cites the Pri-
vacy Act, the agency would process the request under the Privacy Act,
applying the exemptions, time limits, fee provisions and appeal processes
specified therein.124 Conversely, if a requester of first-party information
cites the FOIA, the agency should process that request under the
FOIA. 125 If neither or both statutes are cited, the agency is to process
the request under both laws. 126 This mirrors the current practice of
many agencies, including the FBI, of processing all first-party requests
under both statutes. 127
B. Environmental Protection Agency.
The EPA recently amended its regulations concerning the payment
of FOIA fees. 128 The new regulations respond in part to the public's
negative reaction to a rule the EPA promulgated in March, 1983.129
That rule sought to "preserve public funds by requiring full payment in
advance, thereby reducing costs to the Government of collecting fees and
to avoid defaults by individuals who request costly record searches.' 30
The 1983 rule, however, turned out to be a particularly controver-
sial source of public concern. 131 In response, and to put an end to litiga-
tion on the matter, the EPA published an interim final rule that
reinstates the procedures in effect prior to March 17, 1985.132 The new
rule does not require actual prepayment, but does require that the re-
quester either prepay or make "acceptable arrangements to pay" the to-
not an exemption 3 statute. Pub. L. No. 98-477, § 702, 98 Stat. 2209, 2212 (1984) ("No agency shall
rely on any exemption in this section to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise
accessible to such individual under the provisions of section 552 of this title."). An agency may not
now base a decision to withhold first-party information, available under the FOIA, on the Privacy
Act.




128. See 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.100-.311).
129. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,270 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.120 (1984)).
130. Id. The 1983 rule was designed to solve the problem of requesters who defaulted on fee
payments after receiving EPA records. The EPA claimed that an internal audit disclosed "that a
number of requesters who have received records under FOIA are not making timely payments for
such records." Id.
The 1983 rule stated that where the potential fee is estimated to be over $25, "a [FOIA] request
will not be deemed to have been received until the requester is notified of the estimated fees and the
requester pays the total amount of fees due (or estimated to become due)." 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(c)
(1984).
131. 50 Fed. Reg. 32,950 (1985).
132. Id.
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tal fees due.133 The EPA has indicated that this may not be the final
word on fee prepayment, however, and the agency still considers some
form of prepayment necessary to avoid defaults and reduce processing
Costs. 134
The EPA also amended its regulations concerning public informa-
tion and confidentiality. 135 Changes were made in both subpart A of the
EPA regulations, 136 which addresses response to FOIA requests in gen-
eral, and subpart B, 1 37 which outlines procedures for handling business
information. Although the changes in subpart A are relatively technical,
a few are notable. The regulations had provided that FOIA search fees
"may" be reduced if the public interest would be served thereby. 38 The
EPA has changed "may" to "shall," making the regulation's language
more consistent with language of the rate statute.139 Further, although
the new rule increases the hourly rate charged for search fees, it also
increases the number of search hours for which no charge will be
made."4° Finally, the rule clarifies the appeals process for denials of
FOIA requests by specifying that only initial denials of requests for ex-
isting and located records may be appealed to the agency. 141
The most significant amendment to subpart B eliminates the re-
quirement that business submitters receive ten days' notice before the
agency discloses confidential business information to Congress or the
133. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,660 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(c)). The new rule
also requires any requester who does not pay his fees within sixty calendar days of a request for
payment to be placed on a delinquent list. Id The EPA will not process any requests submitted by
a person on the delinquent list. Id.
134. 50 Fed. Reg. 32,950 (1985).
135. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,655 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2).
136. 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.100-120 (1984).
137. 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.202-305 (1984).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(d) (1984).
139. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,660 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(d)). The FOIA
states that "[d]ocuments shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency
determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the infor-
mation can be considered aspimarily benefitting the generalpublic." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982)
(emphasis added).
140. For a discussion of the rule at the time it was being proposed, see 50 Fed. Reg. 32,952
(1985). See also 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,660 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)) (final
rule).
141. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,657 (1985). The new rule specifies that because an agency response
stating that a requested record is not known to exist is not a denial, it is therefore not appealable.
See id. at 51,657, 51,659 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.112, 2.113, 2.114).
This rule could be misused. The EPA could claim that it does not know that a certain record
exists and thus deny an administrative appeal. Individual requesters who do not have the resources
to pursue the matter to litigation would be unable to have the agency's initial determination
reviewed.
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Comptroller General.142 The agency believes that this notice require-
ment unduly delays the reporting of necessary information to Congress
and the Comptroller General. 143 Under the new rule, the affected busi-
ness would still receive notice, but not necessarily before disclosure. 44
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Threshold Issues: Application of the FOIA to Departments within
the Executive Office of the President.
The Freedom of Information Act establishes mandatory disclosure
requirements that apply exclusively to "agencies."' 145 In 1985, in
Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 146 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Council of
Economic Advisers (the "Council") was not an "agency" and that its
records were therefore not subject to the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA.
142. The current rules are found at 40 C.F.R. § 2.209(b) (1985). The new rule is at 50 Fed. Reg.
51,654, 51,661 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.209(b)(1)).
143. 50 Fed. Reg. 32,953 (1985).
144. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,661 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2.209(b)(2)). The new
rule calls for notice to be given ten days in advance of disclosure to Congress "except where it is not
possible to provide notice ten days in advance of any date established by the requesting body for
responding to the request." Id.
In addition to the activity noted, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promulgated
new rules pertaining to FOIA. Currently, any identifiable record, "whether in the possession of the
NRC, its contractors, its subcontractors, or others, shall be made available for inspection and copy-
ing." 10 C.F.R. § 9.4 (1985). Agency practice, however, is that records not actually in possession or
control of the agency itself (here, the NRC) are not considered "records" and thus are not subject to
the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178
(1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150-54 (1980). To
conform with this practice, the NRC is changing the rule to read "[a]ny identifiable record in the
possession of the NRC shall be made available." 50 Fed. Reg. 41,128 (1985) (to be codified at 10
C.F.R. § 9.4).
The NRC has also followed the lead of other federal agencies in establishing a central decision-
making approach for handling subpoenas of Commission records in litigation not involving the NRC
as a party. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,642, 37,643 (1985) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 9). The new regulations
specify that all subpoenas or other judicial and quasi-judicial demands for records that are served on
NRC employees are to be referred to the Commission's general counsel who will "review the pro-
posed discovery, ascertain the scope of the proposal, and decide on the approach to be followed in
each case, including authorizing litigation, if necessary, to resolve disputes between the NRC and the
party seeking discovery." Id. at 37,643.
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(6) (1982). Subsection (a)(3), the most commonly invoked portion
of the FOIA, provides:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if
any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any
person.
146. 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Under the FOIA, an agency is defined as "any executive department
... or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President)." 147 Although the
Council would seem to qualify as such an "establishment," 148  the
Rushforth court concluded that the statutory definition should not be
applied literally. 149 The legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amend-
ments reveals Congress's desire to codify the functional test of agency
status that the judiciary had already developed.150 Under this test, the
147. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1982).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 1023(a) (1982). Other entities within the Executive Office of the President
include the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the Office of Policy
Development, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Office of Administration. See UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 81-90 (1985).
149. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1040 (citing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980)).
150. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1040-41. The legislative history is ambiguous as to whether the
Council may be considered a FOIA "agency." Subsection (e) was added during the extensive
amendment of the FOIA in 1974. The House Report on the amendments explains that the reference
to the "Executive Office of the President" contained in subsection (e) "means such functional entities
as... the Council of Economic Advisers." H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974). The
Conference Report upon which the court of appeals relied, however, states that "[w]ith respect to
the meaning of the term 'Executive Office of the President' the conferees intend the result reached in
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 ([D.C. Cir.] 1971). The term is not to be interpreted as including the
President's immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise
and assist the President." S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
The court of appeals ultimately found that the House Report could not be squared with the
Conference Report or the result reached in Soucie. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1040. The court stated:
Where, as here, the specific mention of the CEA in the House Report was dropped and a
specific, judicially formulated test was adopted by the Conference Committee for determin-
ing the FOIA status of such entities, the House Report is entitled to little weight in this
respect. Manifestly, the Conference elected to embrace a test to be substituted for a listing
of the entities to be included; the outcome of the case before us should, accordingly, turn
on an examination of Soucie and the sole-function test enunciated in that case.
Id. at 1040-41.
It may be possible, however, to reconcile the House Report with the Conference Report and the
result in Soucie. In Soucie, the entity whose agency status was under consideration was the Office of
Science and Technology (OST)-now the Office of Science and Technology Policy, see supra note
148. For the Soucie court, the determinative factors in concluding that OST was an agency included
the OST's status as a distinct entity and its statutory function of evaluating the scientific research
programs of various federal agencies. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075. Put more generally, the Soucie
court resolved the agency question by determining that the OST had "substantial independent au-
thority in the exercise of specific functions." Id. at 1073. In similar respects, the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers' authorization statute contemplates some degree of functional independence and
directs the Council to appraise various federal programs and activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1023(C)(3)
(1982). The similarities between the CEA and the OST are also evidenced by the legislative history
of the reorganization plan under which the OST was created. See 108 CONG. REc. 8473 (1962)
("[Clongressional committees will be able to deal with [the OST] on the same basis as they do with
the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers.") (statement of Rep. Holifield),
quoted in Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075; H.R. REP. No. 1635, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962) (the President
sought to establish the OST "on roughly the same basis as the... Council of Economic Advisers")
(quoting Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962 Before the Subcomm. on Executive and
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FOIA applies only to executive organizations with some measure of in-
dependent authority. 151 In other words, if "the sole function of the entity
within the Executive Office is to advise and assist the President," that
organization is not an "agency" subject to the FOIA. 52
The Rushforth court applied this test by evaluating the Council's
duties under its organic statute. 153 Unlike other entities within the Exec-
utive Office that may properly be termed "agencies,"'' 5 4 the Council is
not empowered to promulgate regulations, issue guidelines, or take any
other form of "direct action."' 55 On this basis, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the Council was created only to provide advice and assist-
ance to the President and, as a consequence, was excluded from FOIA
disclosure coverage. 156
The purpose of the "sole function" test is to limit the reach of the
FOIA in such a way as to exclude those entities having no real decision-
making authority in the administration of national policies. 157 This limi-
tation insulates the deliberative process of executive decisionmaking from
disruptive public scrutiny-protection commonly referred to as "execu-
tive privilege."' l58 In Rushforth, the court of appeals expanded that pro-
Legislative Reorganization of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962)
(statement of Elmer B. Staats, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget)), quoted in Soucie, 448 F.2d
at 1074; see also Pacific Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1263-64, 1263
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing the House Report referring to inclusion of Council of Economic Advis-
ers in subsection (e) definition).
151. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1041 ("By virtue of its independent function of evaluating federal
programs, the OST must be regarded as an agency subject to the [FOIA].") (quoting Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); see also Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW,
504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (agency status under the FOIA turns on "whether [the entity]
has any authority in law to make decisions").
152. Rushforth, at 1040-41.
153. Id. at 1042 & n.6; see also supra note 151.
154. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Office of Science and Technol-
ogy is an "agency" under FOIA); see also Pacific Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636
F.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Council on Environmental Quality is an agency under FOIA for
purposes of the Sunshine Act).
155. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1042-43; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1023 (1982).
156. Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1042-43.
157. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
158. The executive privilege finds expression in the FOIA through exemption 5, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (1982). That subsection excludes from the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
FOIA "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums ... not available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency." IaL The exemption has been construed to protect advice,
recommendations, and opinions that are a part of the deliberative process of executive decisionmak-
ing. See, eg., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975) (distinguishing between
records used in deliberative process and records "which not only invariably explain agency action
already taken or an agency decision already made, but also constitute 'final dispositions' of matters
by an agency"); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-91 (1973) (discussing scope of exemption 5); Coastal
States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (purpose of privilege
is to encourage frank, open discussion on policy matters between subordinate and chief, protect
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tection beyond the communications between decisionmaker and adviser.
Under the "sole function" test, ancillary functions performed by a
strictly advisory organization are not subject to mandatory FOIA disclo-
sure even when they are non-advisory in nature. 59
The "sole function" test may be over-inclusive. General pre-delib-
erative functions, such as gathering and analyzing information, produce
the data upon which decisionmakers rely. 160 These functions can be
meaningfully distinguished from purely advisory functions. 161 For ex-
ample, to fulfill its statutory duty to provide the President with effective
advice and assistance, the Council must engage in extensive fact-finding
against premature disclosure of proposed policies, and insure that the public is cognizant of the
rationale and motivations that lie behind a specific policy, not those that are rejected); Washington
Post Co. v. Department of the Air Force, 617 F. Supp. 602, 604 (D.D.C. 1985) (exemption 5 or
"executive" privilege "protects advice, recommendations, and opinions which are part of the deliber-
ative decision making processes of government").
159. The court's denial of agency status to the CEA, Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1043, relieves the
agency of responsibility to disclose any materials requested under the FOIA, even information relat-
ing to nonadvisory functions.
160. These ancillary functions may usefully be generalized as "investigatory" in nature. The
distinction between investigatory and "legislative" functions, while evident, cannot always be clearly
drawn. For example, the court in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noted
that "[t]he power of investigation has long been recognized as an incident of legislative power neces-
sary to the enactment and effective enforcement of wise laws .... Congress has often delegated
portions of its investigatory power to administrative agencies." The essential point for present pur-
poses is that just as the power of investigation is "an incident to legislative power," such investiga-
tory power is similarly incidental to administrative decisionmaking.
161. An analogy may be drawn to decisions under exemption 5 in which the courts have distin-
guished purely "factual" material which must be disclosed, from "opinion" material which may be
withheld. See, eg., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (distinction between "materials reflecting
deliberative or policy-making process on the one hand, and purely factual, investigative matters on
the other"); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(the privilege protected under exemption 5 "applies only to the 'opinion' or 'recommendatory' por-
tion ... not to factual information which is contained in the document"); Ryan v. Department of
Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (facts in predecisional documents subject to disclo-
sure unless they are "inextricably intertwined" with exempt material); Washington Post Co. v. De-
partment of the Air Force, 617 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D.D.C. 1985) ("As a general rule, regardless of
whatever other privileges may apply, factual material must be disclosed while advisory material may
be withheld.").
Many courts have been particularly rigorous in insisting that agencies segregate factual from
"advisory" materials in requested agency records. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 466 F. Supp. 1088,
1097-99 (D.D.C. 1978), af#'d, 663 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington Post Co. v. Department of
the Air Force, 617 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D.D.C. 1985); Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. Mathews,
415 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.D.C. 1976). Such rigor may indicate the courts' recognition of the public's
interest in the facts that inform agency decisions. In the case of the Council of Economic Advisers,
its evaluations of other agencies, 15 U.S.C. § 1023(c)(3) (1982), economic forecasts and appraisals,
15 U.S.C. § 1023(c)(2)-(5) (1982), and decisions with respect to the hiring of specialists to assist the
Council in the performance of its statutory duties, 15 U.S.C. § 1023(b), would similarly include
"facts" implicating public interests of a high order.
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followed by analysis of the economic data it has collected. 162 The Coun-
cil must then present the President with these facts, its interpretation of
them, and its recommendations. All three types of information can have
profound effects on national economic policies. 163 By excluding all three
types of information from FOIA coverage, the "sole function" test
shields facts and interpretations used in policy decisions from being eval-
uated by concerned observers.
B. National Security and the CIA: Expanded Protection Under
Exemption 3.
Exemption 3 of the FOIA allows an agency to withhold records that
have been "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute... provided
that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the pub-
lic in such a manner as to leave [the agency] no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld."' 64 In 1985, in Central Intelligence
Agency v. Sims, 165 the Supreme Court of the United States held that sec-
tion 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (the "Security
Act") 166 is a statute referring to "particular types of matters to be with-
held" and thus acts as a shield against the mandatory disclosure require-
ments of the FOIA. 167
In Sims, the CIA had received a FOIA request for records listing
the names and institutional affiliations of researchers who had partici-
pated in a CIA program, code-named MKULTRA, that was conducted
between 1953 and 1966.168 The CIA undertook this program to redress a
162. For example, the Council is given power to "employ, and fix the compensation of, such
specialists and other experts as may be necessary for the carrying out of its functions," 5 U.S.C.
§ 1023(1.) (1982), "to gather timely and authoritative information concerning economic develop-
ments and economic trends," 5 U.S.C. § 1023(c)(2) (1982), and "to appraise the various programs
and activities of the Federal Government," 5 U.S.C. § 1023(c)(3) (1982).
163. See Flash, The Knowledge-Power Relationship: The Council of Economic Advisers, in Bu-
REAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 97, 98 (F. Rourke 3d ed. 1978). ("The acceptance of
the Council's expertise as the President's economists increases the acceptance of his authority in
matters of economic policy ...."). As Flash cogently observes, the influence of the Council largely
depends on the President's confidence in its expertise. &a at 101. To the extent the President uses
economic analysis in the formulation of national policies, the Council is the source to which the
President is most likely to turn for "economic facts." The Council's members are, after all, ap-
pointed by the President, 15 U.S.C. § 1023(a) (1982), and he presumably views them as competent.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
165. 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
166. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982).
167. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1887.
168. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The records at issue involved the
names of universities and other institutions along with the individual researchers that had received
funding either directly or indirectly from the CIA to engage in the research program. Also involved
were specific grant proposals and contracts awarded under the program. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp.
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perceived imbalance between the brainwashing and interrogation tech-
niques of the United States and those of communist regimes. 169 The CIA
refused to disclose the names of the researchers and of twenty-one of the
institutions involved,170 relying on exemption 3 and the Security Act. 171
Under the Security Act, the Director of Central Intelligence is "responsi-
ble for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 172 Therefore, the propriety of the CIA's refusal to disclose
turned on two questions: (1) whether the term "intelligence sources and
methods" as used in the Security Act specifies "particular matters to be
withheld" so as to qualify as an exemption 3 statute; and (2) if so,
whether the MKULTRA researchers and institutions qualified as "intel-
ligence sources." 173
84, 84-85 (D.D.C. 1979). The MKULTRA project involved at least 80 institutions and 185 individ-
ual researchers, many of which had no knowledge of the CIA's involvement because they obtained
funding from "front" organizations. Sims, 642 F.2d at 564.
169. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1884. The MKULTRA program was originally conceived as a defensive
measure, based on the government's "concern[] about inexplicable behavior of persons behind the
'iron curtain' and American prisoners of war who had been subjected to so-called 'brainwashing.'
.. T]his defensive counterintelligence orientation became secondary as the possibilities for the use
of such techniques to obtain information from enemy agents became apparent." Sims v. CIA, 479 F.
Supp. 84, 91 (D.D.C. 1979) (affidavit of Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence). In some
cases, the research involved the use of mind-altering "chemical and biological substances" adminis-
tered to "unwitting" subjects, Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1980), many of whom were
American students. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87. The experiments led to tragic results with at least two
known deaths and untold (probably as yet unknown) health damage. Sims, 642 F.2d at 564.
The mystery surrounding the MKULTRA project is the consequence of a 1973 CIA purge of
MKULTRA records ordered by former Director Richard Helms. Most of the details surrounding
the project were lost. The records sought by the plaintiffs in the instant case were part of some 8,000
documents relating to MKULTRA that had escaped the purge and were discovered by the Agency
in 1977. MKULTRA was subjected to intense congressional and executive scrutiny under the com-
mittee leadership of Frank Church in the Senate and former Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.
Sims, 642 F.2d at 564.
170. The Agency released the names of 59 institutions after obtaining their consent. The Agency
did not try to obtain the consent of the individual researchers. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 565 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
171. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1885.
172. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982).
173. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1887. The Court's approach to the issues in Sims is somewhat perplex-
ing. Rather than determine precisely what "intelligence sources" means before asking whether that
term is sufficiently specific to pass muster under exemption 3(B), the Court addressed these issues in
reverse order. In contrast, the district court concluded that it could not
validate the Director's determination that the institutions and researchers involved were
'intelligence sources' without a strong and detailed showing of the work done under the
auspices of MKULTRA or, if that does not make it obvious that intelligence sources are
involved, by the identification of clear, non-discretionary guidelines to test whether an in-
telligence source is involved in a particular case.
Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 87-88 (D.D.C. 1979) (emphasis added). The district court's approach
was born out of reluctance to adopt a standard under exemption 3 and the National Security Act
that is "susceptible to discretionary application and overbroad interpretation." Id. at 87 (footnote
omitted).
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The Supreme Court agreed with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit that the Security Act qualifies as an
exemption 3 statute.174 It rejected, however, the court of appeals' defini-
tion of "intelligence sources."175 The lower court had adopted a need-
for-confidentiality test under which the courts were independently to ap-
praise the actual necessity of withholding the requested information. 176
The Supreme Court rejected this test for two reasons: the wide-ranging
scope of modem intelligence gathering,1 77 and the CIA's expertise in as-
sessing the need for confidentiality in matters involving national
security.178
Recognizing that "secret agents as depicted in novels and the media
are not the typical intelligence source,"' 79 the Court read the Security
174. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1887. See also Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Security Act is an exemption 3 statute); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("It
is settled, in this court, that [the Security Act] is a statute falling within Exemption 3."); National
Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Social Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978) ("We
conclude that [the Security Act] describefs] ... with sufficient particularity the types of information
to be withheld [as required under exemption 3]."); Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 273-275
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (nondisclosure of "intelligence sources" proper under exemption 3).
175. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
176. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 569-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court of appeals defined "intelli-
gence source" as "a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide
the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively,
yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who
provide it." Id. at 571. The court relied on a "mosaic of relevant statutory enactments" in adopting
this narrow definition, concluding that absent a strict standard focusing on the "practical necessity
of secrecy," the CIA would possess a degree of discretion over the disclosure of requested records
that is inconsistent with the FOIA. Id. at 569-71.
The attempt to limit the Agency's discretion was even more explicit when the case came before
the court of appeals for the second time. Insisting upon an independent judgment by the reviewing
court as to the practical necessity for withholding, the appellate court held that explicit guarantees of
confidentiality by the Agency to those who provide information to the CIA were not dispositive of
the submitter's status as an intelligence source. In determining whether a person or entity supplying
information to the CIA is an "intelligence source," the court must focus its attention on the type of
information supplied. This demanding standard of review was premised on two considerations:
(1) an automatic exemption based on CIA guarantees of confidentiality creates a "serious potential
for widespread evasion of the letter and spirit of the FOIA"; and (2) if national security concerns
were implicated by the disclosure of an informant's identity, the CIA may classify the document,
rendering it exempt from disclosure under exemption 1. Sims v. CIA, 709 F.2d 95, 99 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
177. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1888. ('Congress knew quite well that the Agency would gather intelli-
gence from almost an infinite variety of diverse sources.").
178. Id. at 1888.
179. Id. To underscore the breadth of protected sources of information under the National Se-
curity Act, the Court noted that even the fact of a CIA subscription to "an obscure but publicly
available Eastern European technical journal," if disclosed, "could thwart the Agency's efforts to
exploit its value as a source of intelligence information." Id. at 1892. But see Navasky v. CIA, 499
F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (intelligence is essentially "original collection of information";




The "plain meaning" of [section] 102(d)(3) may not be squared with
any limiting definition that goes beyond the statutory requirement that
the information fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign
intelligene .... Section 102(d)(3) contains no such limiting language.
Congress simply and pointedly protected all sources of intelligence
that provide, or are engaged to provide, information the Agency needs
to perform its statutory duties with respect to foreign intelligence.180
Using this definition, the Court held that the Agency's decision to
undertake the MKULTRA project was a reasonable exercise of its statu-
tory intelligence function.18 Having established this nexus between the
information provided by the researchers and the performance of an intel-
ligence function by the Agency, the Court concluded that the research-
ers' names and institutional affiliations were both exempt from
disclosure. 182 Noting that the Security Act commanded the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized
disclosure, the Court held the institutional affiliations to be exempt be-
cause the CIA "has power to withhold superficially innocuous informa-
tion on the grounds that it might enable an observer to discover the
identity of an intelligence source."' 183
The Court's view of the broad-ranging nature of modem intelligence
gathering also led it to defer to the CIA's expertise in determining the
types of information that may compromise national security, 18 4 holding
that where such a question arises, a statute-in this case, the Security
Act-may be found to fall within exemption 3 even if it fails to place
strict limits on an agency's discretion to withhold information requested
under the FOIA. 185 The same considerations led the Court to hold that,
180. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1888. Justice Marshall rejected the notion that the term "intelligence
sources" is self-defining by its "plain meaning." "'[P]lain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the
eye of the beholder,' and in an instance such as this one, in which the term at issue carries with it
more than one plausible meaning, it is simply inappropriate to select a single reading and label it the
'plain meaning.'" Id. at 1897 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Larion, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 1605 (1985) (citations omitted)).
181. Id. at 1890 ("[The record shows that the MKULTRA research was related to the
Agency's intelligence-gathering function in part because it revealed information about the ability of
foreign governments to use drugs and other biological, chemical, or physical agents in warfare or
intelligence operations against adversaries.").
182. Id. at 1892, 1894.
183. Id. at 1893.
184. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
185. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1891 ("The dangerous consequences of [a narrow interpretation of the
Security Act] suggest why Congress chose to vest the Director of Central Intelligence with the broad
discretion to safeguard the Agency's sources and methods of operation.") (emphasis added). Cf
Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 1984) (existence of exemption 3 statute does not suggest
a lowered standard of review; full de novo review is appropriate); Church of Scientology v. United
States Postal Serv., 633 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1980) (Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C.
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within the ill-defined parameters of "national security," the CIA's bur-
den of justification in withholding requested information is significantly
less than that triggered by the typical FOIA request:
The decisions of the Director [of Central Intelligence], who must of
course be familiar with "the whole picture," as judges are not, are wor-
thy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security in-
terests and potential risks at stake. It is conceivable that the mere
explanation of why information must be withheld can convey valuable
information to a foreign intelligence agency.18 6
The Court's decision in Sims illustrates the uneasiness of the federal
judiciary when it is asked to rule on agency disclosure decisions allegedly
§ 410(c)(6) is not an exemption 3 statute because it leaves agency with "complete discretion" to
grant or withhold investigatory files); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (to qualify as an exemption 3 statute, the legislation must prescribe "a formula
whereby the administrator may determine precisely whether disclosure in any instance would pose
the hazard that Congress foresaw"). In contrast to these decisions, the Supreme Court's decision in
Sims indicates that broad discretionary authority to withhold information in a non-FOIA statute
does not defeat the exemption 3 status of that statute.
186. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1893 (emphasis added). The Court repeatedly alluded to the lack of
judicial competence to evaluate national security claims. See id. at 1891 ("We seriously doubt
whether a potential intelligence source will rest assured knowing that judges, who have little or no
background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only
after examining the facts ... to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confiden-
tiality in order to obtain the information."); id. ("There is no reason for a potential intelligence
source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great confidence in the ability of judges to
make those judgments correctly."); id. at 1894 ("jllt is the responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determin-
ing whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the
Agency's intelligence-gathering process."). See also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (federal judiciary "lack[s] the expertise necessary to second guess such agency opinions in the
typical national security FOIA case"); Katz v. Webster, No. 82-1092, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. May
20, 1985) ("Determinations of what is not appropriately protected in the interests of national secur-
ity involves [sic] an analysis where intuition must often control in the absence of hard evidence. This
intuition develops from experience quite unlike that of most judges .... ) (quoting Klaus v. Blake,
428 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1976)).
To be compared with the Court's lack of confidence in the judiciary's ability to discern over-
broad agency withholding under the banner of national security are the expressions of confidence in
the courts made by members of Congress during the 1974 amendment of the FOIA. See, e.g.,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 449 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (remarks of
Sen. Muskie) ("I cannot understand why we should trust a Federal judge to sort out valid from
invalid claims of executive privilege in litigation involving criminal conduct, but not trust him or his
colleagues to make the same unfettered judgments in matters allegedly connected to the conduct of
foreign policy.") [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; id. at 461 (remarks of Sen. Baker) ("In balancing the
minimal risks that a Federal judge might disclose legitimate national security information against the
potential for mischief and criminal activity under the cloak of secrecy, I must conclude that a fully
informed citizenry provides the most secure protection for democracy."). These views apparently
prevailed. President Ford vetoed the amendments, proposing in their stead a "reasonable basis"
standard of judicial review under exemption I. Congress responded by overriding the veto by a vote
of 371 to 31. Id. at 431.
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made in the interest of national security.187 Sims adopted a flexible ap-
proach under exemption 3 that is a significant addition to the already
broad protection available to the CIA under the FOIA's exemption 1
exclusion for matters involving national security. 188  As a result, the
Court has given the CIA an indeterminate degree of latitude in making
187. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
188. The majority was concerned that national security would be compromised under the need-
for-confidentiality test proposed by the court of appeals. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1887-88. Justice Mar-
shall, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the standard adopted by the court of appeals was too
narrow, but disagreed with the majority on the national security issue. Justice Marshall argued that
exemption 1 provided adequate protection: "Exemption I is the keystone of a congressional scheme
that balances deference to the Executive's interest in maintaining secrecy with continued judicial and
congressional oversight." Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1895 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was
also uncomfortable with what he referred to as "a curious example of the Government's litigation
strategy." Id. at 1895 n.3. He noted that:
Exemption 1 . . . plays a crucial role in the protection of Central Intelligence Agency
Information. That the Court does not mention this exemption even once, in the course of
its lengthy analysis on the policy reasons for broadly interpreting the "intelligence source"
provision, is extraordinary. By focusing myopically on the single statutory provision on
which the Agency has chosen to rely .... the Court rewards the agency's decision not to
invoke Exemption 1 in this case.... The cost of acceding to the Agency's litigation strat-
egy, rather than undertaking a thorough analysis of the entire statutory scheme, is to man-
gle, seriously, a carefully crafted statutory scheme.
Id. at 1895-96 (footnote omitted).
The exemption 1 alternative clearly concerned the district court and the court of appeals as
well. In its first opinion, the trial court noted that "the policy objectives which concern the Director
might very well be accommodated by classifying the [records] ... so that the [records] would be
exempt from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)." Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 88 (D.D.C. 1979)
(footnote omitted). That court went so far as to delay the effective date of the disclosure order so as
to permit the agency to reexamine the documents and prepare the exemption I claim. Id.; see also
Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Of course, there is no reason why the CIA may not independently invoke exemption 3. Sims,
642 F.2d at 567-68. In fact, the courts have treated exemption 3 and the Security Act in much the
same fashion as exemption 1 claims. See, eg., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(exemption I considerations "also apply to Exemption 3 when the statute providing criteria for
withholding is in furtherance of national security interests"). Justice Marshall was concerned that
the majority's decision "enables the Agency to avoid making the showing required under the care-
fully crafted balarice embodied in Exemption 1 and thereby thwarts Congress' effort to limit the
Agency's discretion." Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1898 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also United States
Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 565, 570 (D.D.C. 1985) (citing Sims for the proposition that
"Exemption 3 casts a much wider net than the more technical Exemption 1"). Under exemption 3,
the agency avoids the cumbersome classification and court procedures required under exemption 1,
yet still receives the wide-ranging disclosure prerogatives that accompany exemption 1.
Realistically, however, the deference paid to agencies by the federal courts in exemption 1
claims vitiates the practical force of Justice Marshall's argument. The 1985 cases decided under
exemption 1 demonstrate that the courts are following the trend toward a very deferential standard
of review noticed in Comment, supra note 58, at 429-37. These courts have adopted what is tanta-
mount to a rational basis test in determining whether an agency has properly withheld classified
records. In Abbots v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 766 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example, the
court of appeals held that "plausible" and "uncontradicted" assertions set forth in agency affidavits
are sufficient to grant summary judgment for the withholding agency. Id. at 608 (quoting Miller v.
Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). TheAbbots court established the following standard of
review under exemption 1:
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disclosure decisions within the context of intelligence-gathering and the
Court's "great deference" standard may encourage the CIA to assert na-
tional security justifications in an effort to hide improvident agency
behavior.189
[A]n agency is entitled to summary judgment if its affidavits "describe the withheld infor-
mation and the justification for withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a
logical connection between the information and the claimed exemption," and "are not con-
troverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor [sic] by evidence of agency bad
faith."
Abbots, 766 F.2d at 606 (quoting Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982))
(citations omitted). See also Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
While this standard indicates that agency classification decisions may be overturned by the
courts in theory, the practical difficulties faced by the FOIA plaintiff in producing sufficient evidence
render this possibility a metaphysical one at best. For examples of the extreme burden a FOIA
plaintiff must carry in exemption 1 cases, see Abbots, 766 F.2d at 607 n.3 (reversing lower court for
"not giv[ing] the required 'substantial weight'" to agency affidavits); Katz v. Webster, No. 82-1092,
slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1985) ("The national security issue is necessarily speculative. Intelli-
gence deals with possibilities.") (quoting Klaus v. Blake, 428 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1976)). See
generally 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, § 11.13 (1977 & Supp. 1979) ("dis-
covery motion practice will be the key to success" for FOIA plaintiffs in exemption 1 cases); Com-
ment, supra note 58, at 430-31.
Other 1985 decisions have adopted the Abbots standard of review. See Doherty v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1985) (summary judgment appropriate if "documents
withheld logically fall within the claimed exemption" and there is "no doubt as to agency good
faith"); United States Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 565, 569 (D.D.C. 1985) (test is whether "a
logical connection" exists "between the information [and] the claimed exemption") (quoting Salis-
bury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
The adoption of a "reasonable basis" standard is curious in light of the legislative history of the
1974 amendments to the FOIA. In passing these amendments, Congress rejected an explicit appeal
by the Ford administration urging the legislators to adopt such a standard. See SouRCE BOOK,
supra note 186, at 431-34, 484 (Congress voted to override President Ford's veto of the amendments;
veto message proposed "reasonable basis" standard). The amendments in 1974 to exemption I and
in 1976 to exemption 3 were born of congressional dissatisfaction with the judiciary's reluctance to
independently evaluate agency decisions to withhold. See, eg., Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing legislative history of 1974 and 1976 FOIA amendments); Ray v. Turner,
587 F.2d 1187, 1199-214 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring) (extensive discussion of the
FOIA's legislative history, with emphasis on the amendments); see also supra note 187.
189. The only limit that the FOIA places on the CIA in protecting its sources of information is
that the information provided must be reasonably related to the agency's statutory intelligence func-
tion. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. Yet, the Court goes on to state that if disclosure of
information could possibly lead to the exposure of an intelligence source, such information is also
protected under the Security Act. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. As Justice Marshall
observed, "the class that the Court defines is boundless. It is difficult to conceive of anything the
Central Intelligence Agency might have within its many files that might not disclose or enable an
observer to discover something about where the Agency gathers information." Sims, 105 S. Ct. at
1899 (Marshall, J., concurring). Even claims that certain CIA activities are ultra vires do not seem
capable of defeating the Agency's withholding. See, eg., Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("claim of activities ultra vires the CIA charter is irrelevant to an exemption 3
claim"); see also Founding Church of Scientology v. National Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 829 n.49
(D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Although NSA would have no protectable interest in suppressing information
simply because its release might uncloak an illegal operation, it may properly withhold records gath-
ered illegally if divulgence would reveal currently viable information channels .... ). In this respect
the Sims requirement of a nexus between some identifiable intelligence function and the requested
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C. Privileged and Confidential Commercial Information.
Under exemption 4, agencies may withhold from FOIA requesters
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential."' 190 This exemption has been nar-
rowly construed by the courts, which have found its legislative history
uninstructive. 191 Although the courts of appeals take various approaches
to the question of what may be considered a "trade secret," 192 the courts
generally find that the "commercial or financial information" and "sub-
mitted by a person" requirements are satisfied if the information fits the
ordinary meaning of those terms. 193
Courts have generally defined the scope of the terms "privileged and
confidential" in exemption 4 according to the objective test established in
information evaporates under the additional inquiry whether disclosure would allow one to recon-
struct the source of the information on the basis of "superficially innocuous information." The CIA
could simply assert that the source engaged in the ultra vires activity in question has or is currently
engaged in a legitimate intelligence operation and is thus deserving of continued protection in the
form of nondisclosure.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). In order for agency records to fall within the exemption they
must meet each of the statutory requirements: (I) they must involve a "trade secret" that is "com-
mercial or financial" in nature, (2) that was submitted by a "person," and (3) which is "privileged"
or "confidential." See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252,
266 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 627 F.2d 392, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244-45 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
191. See, eg., 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, 721 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1983) ("At least part of the confusion surrounding exemption 4 must
be attributed to what has been described as 'the tortured, not to say obfuscating, legislative history of
the FOIA ... ') (quoting American Airlines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 865
(2d Cir. 1978)); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1975)
("The tendency has been to grant little weight to [the legislative history of Exemption 4]."); see
generally Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1061-
62 (1975) ("Although [exemption 4's] language and legislative history would permit [its application]
to a wide range of information, the courts have limited its application.").
192. See Note, Developments-1983, supra note 58, at 405-07.
193. For discussion of the meaning of "commercial or financial" as those terms are used in
exemption 4, see Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 266
(D.C. Cir. 1982). One area of controversy concerns information submitted by nonprofit organiza-
tions. Compare Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(information provided by nonprofit organization is not "commercial or financial") with American
Airlines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978) (term "commercial"
includes information "pertaining or relating to or dealing with commerce").
The only significant exclusion from exemption 4 arising from the requirement that information
be "submitted by a person" is information generated by the government. See Grumman Aircraft
Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Consumers Union of the
United States v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
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National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton:194
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for purposes of [ex-
emption 4] if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the
following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain nec-
essary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained. 195
Although the distinction has received scant judicial treatment, 196 it is
clear that the term "privileged" is not synonymous with "confiden-
tial." 197 The legislative history of exemption 4 indicates that the term
"privileged" was intended to shield from disclosure "information cus-
tomarily subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, or lender-borrower
privileges"-privileges that arise from concerns distinguishable from
those addressed in National Parks.'98 Two judicial decisions in 1985 in-
dicate that the "privileges" recognized in exemption 4 may have far-
reaching effects on the ability of agencies to withhold commercial and
financial information.
In a "reverse FOIA" case, Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
Block, 199 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit defined
the scope of the exemption 4 "privilege." The plaintiff, Sharyland Water
Supply Corporation ("Sharyland") brought suit to enjoin disclosure of
audit reports the corporation had filed with the Farmers Home Adminis-
194. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY AcTs: 1984 SUPPLEMENT 31-32 (R. Bouchard ed. 1984) ("[Earlier tests have been super-
seded by the rule of National Parks, ... the leading case on the issue of 'confidentiality' under
Exemption 4.") (citation omitted).
195. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770 (footnotes omitted).
196. Two district court cases have discussed the "privileged" component of exemption 4. In
Indian Law Resource Center v. Department of the Interior, 477 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1979),
the court upheld agency nondisclosure of work performed by a law firm for the Hopi Indians on the
ground that the information was "privileged" commercial information. The "attorney-client" privi-
lege was again recognized under exemption 4 in Miller, Anderson, Nash, Yerke & Weiner v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 499 F. Supp. 767, 770-71 (D. Or. 1980).
197. Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 267
n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
198. H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2418, 2427. The report states that exemption 4
would assure the confidentiality of information obtained by the Government through ques-
tionnaires or through material submitted and disclosures made in procedures such as the
mediation of labor-management controversies. It exempts such material if it would not
customarily be made public by the person from whom it was obtained .... It would
include information customarily subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, or lender-bor-
rower privileges such as technical or financial data submitted by an applicant to a Govern-
ment lending or loan guarantee agency. It would also include information which is given
to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government.
Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose docu-
ments or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
199. 755 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1985).
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tration (FHA).2°° The FH-A had previously agreed to release the reports
to parties in litigation with Sharyland in pending state court proceed-
ings.201 The FOIA request was submitted after the state court refused to
order discovery of the disputed documents.202 Sharyland argued before
the court of appeals that the report constituted privileged and confiden-
tial financial information protected from disclosure by exemption 4.203
Using a variation of the National Parks test, the court of appeals
accepted the district court's finding that disclosure was not likely to im-
pair Sharyland's competitive position.2°4 The information in question,
therefore, could not be considered "confidential. '20 5 Sharyland argued
that the information was nonetheless exempt from disclosure under the
lender-borrower privilege recognized in the legislative history of exemp-
tion 4.206
The court of appeals rejected this argument. It held that "the term
'privileged' refers only to privileges created by the Constitution, statute,
or the common law" and concluded that "[n]one of these sources recog-
nizes a lender-borrower privilege. '20 7
To an extent, the Fifth Circuit construes the privileges protected in
exemption 4 in the same way that the Supreme Court construed the
scope of exemption 5 in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp. 208 In
Weber Aircraft, the Court held that the privileges mentioned in the legis-
lative history were not an exclusive list.20 9 Rather, it held that exemp-
200. Id at 398.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 398-99.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 399.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 400 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that the House report referring to specific
privileges, see supra note 236, was made in reference to an earlier bill preceding the introduction of
the terms "commercial or financial" to the language of exemption 4. The addition of these terms
without modifications of the congressional reports led the court to conclude that the FOIA "creates
no privileges.. .L] neither does it diminish those existing." Id. (quoting Chamber of Commerce of
the United States v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 423 U.S. 1309, 1310 (1975)).
208. 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
209. Id. at 802. Unlike that of Weber Aircraft, however, the rationale of Sharyland directly
contradicts that of Congress as revealed in the legislative history. Weber Aircraft did not reject the
privileges recognized in the legislative history, but held that those mentioned provided but "rough
analogies." Id. (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973)); see also Note, Developments-1984,
supra note 2, at 764-66 (discussing Weber Aircraft). The Sharyland court, however, rejected a privi-
lege recognized in the legislative history, Sharyland, 755 F.2d at 400, stating: "[W]e are not inclined
to subordinate the unambiguous language of the statute to clearly contradictory legislative history.
To hold otherwise would be to undermine the principle that enacted legislation should be generally
considered the final and authoritative expression of the will of Congress on a matter." Id. (quoting
Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1975)). The court's reasoning
in this respect is perplexing. The statutory language of exemption 4 neither defines nor offers any
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tion 5 incorporates well-recognized statutory and common law
privileges.210 Unlike Weber Aircraft, however, the Sharyland court gave
little weight to the fact that the FOIA was being used to circumvent
discovery limitations placed on the FOIA requester;211 the court's opin-
ion did not discuss the possibility that privileges against discovery might
be recognized in exemption 4. As a consequence, the Sharyland court
upheld the district court's refusal to enjoin the FHA's disclosure of the
reports.21 2
In contrast, in Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health and
Human Services,213 the federal district court in the District of Columbia
Circuit held that "[Weber Aircraft's] analytical approach to the incorpo-
ration of discovery privileges into Exemption 5 applies equally in the Ex-
emption 4 context. ' 21 4
The plaintiff in Washington Post sought disclosure of forms entitled
"Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial Interest" (Form
474). These forms were submitted to the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) by members of the advisory boards and commit-
tees of the National Cancer Institute, a division of the National Institute
of Health215 as required by the Ethics in Government Act.216 Because
the forms require a list of the consultants' financial interests, they qualify
guidance whatsoever on what the term "privileged" is meant to embrace. Thus, it is difficult to see
how it excludes privileges explicitly mentioned in the legislative history.
210. Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 800-02.
211. In Weber Aircraft, the Court noted that it "would create an anomaly [if] the FOIA could be
used to supplement civil discovery." Id. at 801 (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14
(1982)).
212. Sharyland, 755 F.2d at 400.
In looking to FOIA exemption 4 as a source for challenging the propriety of the FHA's decision
to disclose the audit reports, the court failed to consider whether the FOIA may properly be invoked
by a plaintiff seeking to halt agency disclosure of information. The Supreme Court has squarely held
that the FOIA provides no cause of action for persons seeking such relief. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979); see also infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text. The FOIA exemptions
define the parameters of an agency's discretion to withhold information; the exemptions do not
require an agency to withhold information that falls within their terms. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 291-
92. An agency's decision to disclose information is unassailable under the FOIA, even by the person
who submitted the information to the agency in the first instance. Id. Sharyland is important none-
theless; it is the only appellate decision to squarely consider the meaning of the term "privileged" in
exemption 4.
213. 603 F. Supp. 235 (D.D.C. 1985).
214. Id. at 238 n.10.
215. Id. at 236.
216. 5 U.S.C. app. § 201() (1982 & Supp. I 1984). Form 474 contains a "limited pledge of
confidentiality," indicating that the submitted information may be disclosed "for good cause" at the
discretion of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission or the head of the "principal operating
component or designee." See Washington Post, 603 F. Supp. at 236 (quoting Form 474).
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as "financial information obtained from a person" under exemption 4.217
The significant issue in Washington Post, therefore, was whether the
forms were "privileged."
In holding that Form 474 information is "privileged" under exemp-
tion 4, the district court relied on Weber Aircraft and an earlier decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit2 18 recognizing a "confidential report privilege. ' 219 The earlier case
had held that a completed Form 474 was not discoverable under Rule
26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.220 In upholding the
agency's decision to withhold the forms, the Washington Post court rea-
soned that "the policies underlying this discovery privilege would be
thwarted if a party could obtain through the FOIA information not dis-
coverable under the Federal Rules. '221
Although the scope of the "confidential report privilege" is uncer-
tain,22 2 Washington Post may signal a significant shift in the treatment
given commercial information under exemption 4. Such a shift would
afford broader protection of commercial information submitted to the
government than does the narrower reading traditionally given exemp-
tion 4 under the National Parks test.
D. Exemption 5 and "Inter-agency or Intra-agency" Memoranda.
In 1985, two decisions construing exemption 5223 of the FOIA held
that the corpus of well-established discovery privileges incorporated into
exemption 5 in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp. 224 is inapplicable if
the withheld records are not "inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters. '225
217. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252,
266 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (list of financial interests required under Form 474 includes "financial" infor-
mation within exemption 4).
218. Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Women
in Science court held that the "confidential report privilege" may be invoked only by the govern-
ment and only in situations where it is necessary to ensure that the government will receive the type
of information that is contained in the disputed record. Id. at 343-44.
219. See Washington Post, 603 F. Supp. at 238.
220. Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
221. Washington Post, 603 F. Supp. at 239.
222. See generally Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privi-
lege, 76 COLUM. L. RIv. 142, 149-52 (1976).
223. Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1985); NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985).
224. 465 U.S. 792, 798-800 (1984).
225. Exemption 5 allows an agency to withhold "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (1982).
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In Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB,226 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that
Weber did not decide what constitutes internal agency documents; the
decision expressly left open the question whether exemption 5 could
cover documents submitted to an agency by persons outside the gov-
ernment. Weber stands for the proposition that once it is determined
that internal agency documents are involved, exemption 5 incorporates
all civil discovery privileges. 227
At issue in Van Bourg were affidavits submitted to the NLRB as
part of an unfair labor practices investigation.228 In addition to arguing
that these documents could be withheld under exemption 7(c), the
NLRB argued that they were immune from civil discovery and thus,
under Weber Aircraft, came within exemption 5.229
The court of appeals disagreed, 230 holding that statements that are
made by witnesses who are not agency employees231 and that are not
prepared by an agency as internal documents or for use in litigation are
not "internal agency" documents; thus, they do not meet the threshold
test of exemption 5.232 Having found that the documents failed to meet
the first of exemption 5's requirements, the court declined to address the
question of whether any civil discovery privileges might apply to the
records. 233
The district court in the District of Columbia Circuit reached a sim-
ilar conclusion in NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund v. United
States Department of Justice.234 After the Supreme Court decided Fire
Fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 235 the Department of Justice sent
letters to fifty local governments seeking voluntary modification of af-
firmative action provisions arrived at in consent decrees to which these
governments were subject.236 The plaintiff in this case sought copies of
the letters sent by local governments in reply to these Department of
226. 751 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1985).
227. Id. at 984-85 (citations omitted).
228. Id. at 983.
229. Id. at 983-84.
230. Id. at 985.
231. Cf. Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 798 n.13 ("[T]he material at issue here includes only state-
ments made by Air Force personnel.").
232. Van Bourg, 751 F.2d at 985.
233. Id.
234. 612 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985).
235. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). In Stotts, the Supreme Court held that a district court may not, for
the sake of an affirmative action program, order a municipality to bypass a bona fide seniority sys-
tem. The Court held that title VII "permits the routine application of a seniority system absent
proof of an intention to discriminate." Id. at 2587.
236. NAACP Legal Defense, 612 F. Supp. at 1144.
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Justice inquiries. 237
The Department refused to disclose five of the requested docu-
ments.238 Because these reply letters were part of settlement negotia-
tions, the Department argued that they were immune from civil
discovery and that therefore, under Weber Aircraft, exemption 5 shielded
the Department's withholding decision.239 As in Van Bourg, the court in
NAACP Legal Defense found that the Department had failed to satisfy
the threshhold requirement of exemption 5; the documents were "clearly
not inter or intra-agency memoranda.' ' 24° Even assuming that the initial
inquiry had been satisfied, the court noted, the "negotiation privilege"
recognized in Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 241 failed to meet
the standard of Weber Aircraft.242 Rule 408 merely "limits a document's
relevance at trial, not its disclosure for other purposes. '243
Van Bourg and NAACP Legal Defense both focused on the source of
the requested information in determining whether agency withholding
met with the requirements of exemption 5. The information in these
cases was acquired by the withholding agencies from sources independ-
ent from the agencies themselves, and it was this factor that disqualified
the exemption's application. 244 Other cases, however, have seemed to
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1145.
240. Id. at 1146. In examining case law on the issue, the court concluded that in order for a
document to fall within the exemption, the "author" of the requested document must be "part of a
federal agency or acting in consultation with the agency." Id. See also Hoover v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980) (advice received from outside consultants
"plays an integral function in the government's decision" and is exempt under (b)(5)); Lead Indus-
tries Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1979) (information obtained from private consult-
ant held exempt under (b)(5)); Brush Wellman, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 500 F. Supp. 519, 522
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (memos from technical contract consultant receive exemption 5 protection); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. FTC, 406 F. Supp. 305, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (advice from state government agencies
is exempt under (b)(5)).
241. FED. R. EVID. 408.
242. NAACP Legal Defense, 612 F. Supp. at 1146 ("[TIhe documents at issue ... are not pro-
tected by some long-standing or universally recognized privilege.").
243. Id. (quoting Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749
(D.D.C. 1983); see also id. at 1146 n. 1 (quoting 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVI-
DENCE 408[01], at 408-14 (1985)) ("It should be pointed out that the rule should not be construed so
as to render evidence otherwise discoverable, inadmissible solely because it was presented during
settlement negotiations. The policy of allowing open and free negotiations between parties by ex-
cluding conduct or statements made during the course of these discussions is not intended to conflict
with the liberal rules of discovery embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
244. See Van Bourg, 751 F.2d at 985 ("None of the six contested documents was prepared as an
internal document, by an NLRB official, or for any NLRB attorney as part of litigation. Documents
submitted by private parties in the course of an unfair labor practices investigation are not internal
agency documents."); NAACP Legal Defense, 612 F. Supp. at 1146 ("None of the entities which
authored the letters in question could be viewed as being part of a federal agency or acting in consul-
tation with the agency.").
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disregard the source of the information; they have instead looked to the
use to which the agency applies the information.2 45 In 1985, in Badhwar
v. United States Department of the Air Force,246 for example, a district
court upheld an agency's decision to withhold statements made by per-
sons who had witnessed military air accidents. Without considering
whether these statements were internal agency documents, the court
found exemption 5 applicable on the basis of Weber Aircraft. 247
The Badhwar court focused on how the agency used the witnesses'
statements. 248 The agency incorporated the statements into a safety
board report which itself contained intra-agency recommendations.
These reports were then forwarded within the agency to those responsi-
ble for instituting corrective measures.2 49 In such a situation, there
would seem to be little doubt that the documents are "deliberative,
predecisional, and exempt from disclosure" as internal agency docu-
ments.250 The difficult issue is whether documents or statements submit-
ted to an agency by persons independent of that agency are transformed
into "intra-agency memorandums" by virtue of their inclusion in internal
agency reports.
The 1985 decisions in the lower courts indicate that the expansive
pressure on exemption 5 created by Weber Aircraft may be offset by
more searching inquiries into the source of the record in question and the
use made of it by the withholding agency. While Weber Aircraft limited
245. See, eg., Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 187 (1975)
(recommendations of a regional board fall within "intra-agency memorandum" category because
they are "functionally indistinguishable from the recommendation[s] of any agency staff member
whose judgment has earned the respect of a decision-maker"); Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617
F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Congress apparently did not intend 'inter-agency and intra-agency'
to be rigidly exclusive terms, but rather to include any agency document that is part of the delibera-
tive process."); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The Government may
have a special need for the opinions and recommendations of temporary consultants, and those
individuals should be able to give their judgments freely without fear of publicity.").
246. 615 F. Supp. 698, 708 (D.D.C. 1985).
247. Id. at 703. Although Weber Aircraft and Badhwar involved similar factual situations, the
Court in Weber Aircraft noted that the witness statements in that case were made by agency employ-
ees. Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 798 n.13. The Badhwar court made no finding on the issue. In-
stead, the court interpreted Weber Aircraft as "bar[ring] disclosure of statements by witnesses who
have given them in confidence." Badhwar, 615 F. Supp. at 701; see also Washington Post Co. v.
United States Dep't of the Air Force, 617 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D.D.C. 1985) ("The rationale for [the
rule of Weber Aircraft] is that the privilege encourages those with pertinent information to cooperate
with disaster investigators.").
248. Badhwar, 615 F. Supp. at 703 (" 'T]he agency's decisionmaking mechanisms and the docu-
ments' significance within that structure' ... establish that ... the safety board findings, conclusions
and recommendations are deliberative, predecisional, and exempt from disclosure under Exemption
5.") (quoting Murphy v. TVA, 571 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D.D.C. 1983)).
249. Id. at 700.
250. Id. at 703.
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the use of the FOIA as a device to circumvent restraints on civil discov-
ery,251 1985 decisions have shown that exemption 5 may have a narrower
ambit than Weber Aircraft suggested. These decisions emphasized "the
narrow scope of exemption (b)(5) and the strong public policy that the
public is entitled to know what the government is doing and why."'252 At
the same time, substantial questions remain concerning the scope of the
term "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandum."
E. Reverse FOIA.
The FOIA is "exclusively a disclosure statute";25 3 the nine specific
exemptions of subsection (b)254 are merely limits on an agency's discre-
tion to withhold requested information, and "were not meant to mandate
nondisclosure. ' 255 Questions involving the propriety of agency with-
holding thus generally depend on the applicability of these exemptions
and the strength of the policy considerations underlying them.256 The
proper approach to reviewing an agency's decision to disclose informa-
tion is not as well-settled, and the basis on which disclosure may be suc-
cessfully challenged is uncertain. 257
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld a claim by former President Nixon that the Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (the "Materials
251. Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 800-02.
252. NAACP Legal Defense, 612 F. Supp. at 1146-47.
253. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1982).
255. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979). The Court described the general out-
line of the FOIA:
The organization of the [FOIA] is straightforward. Subsection (a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a),
places a general obligation on the agency to make information available to the public and
sets out specific modes of disclosure for certain classes of information. Subsection (b), 5
U.S.C. § 552(b), which lists the exemptions, simply states that the specified material is not
subject to the disclosure obligations set out in subsection (a). By its terms, subsection (b)
demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure.
Id. at 291-92.
256. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1982) provides: "This section does not authorize withholding of infor-
mation or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section."
See also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) ("These exemptions are
specifically made exclusive.., and must be narrowly construed."). But see infra notes 32040 and
accompanying text.
257. Compare Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1985) (as-
suming existence of cause of action to enjoin agency disclosure of information under FOIA) with
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) (no cause of action to enjoin disclosure under
FOIA). See generally 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 188, § 10.06, at 10-26 (noting that reverse-FOIA
suits before Chrysler "had been like an illegitimate child, without statutory parents but very much
alive"); Campbell, Reverse FOIA Litigation, in LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY AcT 74 (A. Adler & M. Halperin 9th ed. 1984).
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Preservation Act")258 displaces the mandatory disclosure requirements
of the FOIA and provides the exclusive mechanism by which certain
records falling within the terms of the Materials Preservation Act may be
disclosed.259 In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Privacy Act 260 does not prohibit an agency
from disclosing information not exempt under the FOIA, even if no for-
mal request under the FOIA has been filed.261
1. Displacement of the FOIA by Other Statutes. In order to pro-
vide guidance for the management and public disclosure of thousands of
documents and recordings either acquired by the Watergate special pros-
ecution force or otherwise related to the presidency of Richard Nixon,
Congress passed the Materials Preservation Act.262 In 1985, eleven years
after the Act's passage, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held in Ricchio v. Kline that the FOIA does not
govern disclosure of transcripts made from recorded White House con-
versations involving former President Nixon.263 Rather, those seeking
disclosure of these records must conform to procedures and regulations
promulgated by the Administrator of the General Services Administra-
tion (GSA) pursuant to the Materials Preservation Act.264
The plaintiff in Ricchio brought suit under the FOIA to compel dis-
closure of certain transcripts of tapes acquired by the Watergate special
prosecution force.265 The GSA agreed to release most, but not all, of the
requested documents.266 With the consent of the parties, President
Nixon intervened to enjoin the disclosure of all the requested docu-
ments.267 The court of appeals held that President Nixon had standing
to seek such an injunction under the APA as a person "adversely affected
or aggrieved" by the agency action.268
Section 104(d) of the Materials Preservation Act provides: "The
provisions of this title shall not in any way affect the rights, limitations or
258. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
259. See infra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.
260. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
261. See infra notes 275-89 and accompanying text.
262. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
263. Ricchio v. Kline, 773 F.2d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
264. Id. at 1393, 1395.
265. Id. at 1391.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1392; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) ("A person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action...
is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
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exemptions applicable under the Freedom of Information Act .... -269
The Act directs the Administrator of the GSA to fashion regulations
governing disclosure of the information falling within the Materials Pres-
ervation Act's provisions. 270 Despite the Act's specific statement that
rights under the FOIA were unaffected, the court held that the Materials
Preservation Act's procedures displaced FOIA procedures by virtue of
the former's "comprehensive, carefully tailored and detailed procedure
designed to protect both the interest of the public in obtaining disclosure
of President Nixon's papers and of President Nixon in protecting the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations and deliberations."'27' To
disclose these materials under the general provisions of the FOIA "might
frustrate the achievement of the legislative goals of orderly processing
and protection of the rights of all affected persons." Simply stated, "the
policies of the [Materials Preservation] Act can best be carried out under
the Act itself. '272
"Displacement" or preemption theories such as that adopted in
Ricchio have generally not been accepted by the courts.273 Whether the
"comprehensive, carefully tailored and detailed procedure" analysis em-
ployed by the court of appeals may be viewed as a "test" to determine the
applicability of the FOIA to information controlled by other statutes is
uncertain. The unique and historically specific nature of the information
sought in Ricchio may lessen the precedential value of the case.274 None-
theless, Ricchio's analysis in applying the displacement theory provides a
269. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 104(d), 88
Stat. 1695, 1698 (1974).
270. Id. § 101(a), 88 Stat. at 1695; see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
429 (1977) ("[The Materials Preservation Act] directs the Administrator of General Services, an
official of the Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers and tape recordings of...
former President Nixon, and promulgate regulations that (1) provide for the orderly processing and
screening by Executive Branch archivists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant
those that are personal and private in nature, and (2) determine the terms and conditions upon
which public access may eventually be had to those materials that are retained."), quoted in Ricido,
773 F.2d at 1393. As of the time of suit, the Administrator of GSA had not fashioned suitable
disclosure regulations. This delay was largely the result of a legislative veto provision contained in
the Materials Preservation Act. See Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 971-72 (D.D.C. 1983)
(invalidating regulations promulgated under Materials Preservation Act due to one-house legislative
veto provision of the type found unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
271. Ricchio, 773 F.2d at 1395.
272. Id at 1394-95 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 606 (1978)).
273. See, eg., Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1984); Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d
998, 1001-03 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Developments-1984, supra note 2, at 783-87.
274. Unlike other agency records, the information covered by the Materials Preservation Act is
of a distinct and unvarying nature. This information is primarily of historical value and does not
specifically refer to ongoing agency activity. The FOIA, while not excluding materials of historical
value, arguably was designed to inform the public of the nature and extent of agency activity, en-
couraging communication between the centers of ongoing administrative action and the citizenry.
See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("The basic purpose of FOIA is
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potentially powerful new tool for enjoining agency disclosure of
information.
2. Reverse FOIA Actions and the Privacy Act. Under the Privacy
Act, disclosure is proper if "required under [the FOIA]." 275 Ordinarily,
the FOIA mandates agency disclosure of all records pursuant to a proper
request, provided the records do not fall within one of the nine exemp-
tions listed in subsection (b) of the FOIA.2 76 In Cochran v. United
States,277 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that disclosure of information that does not fall within a specific
FOIA exemption and has been the subject of "longstanding oral requests
by the media" was "required under the FOIA" within the meaning of the
Privacy Act; a formal FOIA request was not required to trigger the
agency's obligation to disclose.
In Cochran, the Army issued a press release indicating that Major
General James F. Cochran had been fined and reprimanded for misuse of
government resources during his tenure at Fort Stewart, Georgia.278
Cochran sued for damages, arguing that the disclosure of this informa-
tion violated subsection (b) of the Privacy Act.279
Cochran argued that the press release was not "required" under the
FOIA because the disclosure constituted a "clearly unwarranted invasion
of privacy" 280 that entitles an agency to withhold requested information
under exemption 6.281 The court of appeals, however, characterized the
press release as a "textbook example" of the type of information that the
FOIA directs agencies to disclose.282 In weighing the privacy interests of
the plaintiff against the public interest in disclosure,283 the court held
to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.").
275. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1982).
277. 770 F.2d 949, 957-59 (11th Cir. 1985).
278. Id. at 952 n.2.
279. Id. at 952-53. The Privacy Act provides that a person who is aggrieved by agency activity
that violates the provisions of the Act may collect "actual damages sustained... as a result of the
[agency action], but in no case ... less than the sum of $1,000." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (1982).
280. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 953.
281. Under exemption 6, disclosure is not required of "personal and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
282. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 957.
283. In the Senate and House Reports on the section, Congress made it clear that agencies and
the courts were to undertake a "balancing of interests" under exemption 6: "The phrase 'clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of inter-
ests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and
the preservation of the public's right to governmental information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1965); see also H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
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that the balance struck under FOIA exemption six overwhelmingly fa-
vors the disclosure of information relating to a violation of the public
trust by a government official. . . . "To forestall future abuses, the
public has an interest in any deterrent effect disclosure might
provide."'2 84
The absence of a formal written FOIA request, as required by regu-
lations promulgated by the Army in implementing the FOIA,285 posed a
perplexing problem for the court. It is unclear on what basis the court
held that such a request was unnecessary to render the press release "re-
quired under the FOIA. '' 286 The court observed that "it might be ques-
The courts have construed the term "clearly unwarranted" as "instruct[ing] the court to tilt the
balance in favor of disclosure." Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In order for
an agency to withhold records under this exemption, the invasion of privacy must be substantial;
"Exemption 6 was directed at threats to privacy interests more palpable than mere possibilities."
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380 n.19 (1976).
284. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 956. In Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-82
(1976), the Supreme Court approved an order requiring disclosure of Air Force records concerning
proceedings instituted against cadets for honor code violations. Cochran argued that this decision
established that disclosure of military disciplinary proceedings was a per se invasion of privacy pro-
tected by exemption 6. In Rose, however, all information identifying the cadets was deleted in order
to protect their personal privacy interests. Rose, 425 U.S. at 355, The Cochran court distinguished
Rose, noting that while
deletion of identifying information may often provide a workable compromise between an
individual's privacy right and the public's right to know, such deletion is inappropriate in
the case of a high-ranking government official who has misappropriated government facili-
ties. In this situation, identifying information is crucial to the public's interest in holding
such officials accountable to the public and deterring others from similar behavior.
Cochran, 770 F.2d at 956 n.9.
285. 32 C.F.R. § 518.4(d) (1984).
286. The court seemed to assume that the only real violation on the part of the agency was the
failure of the Army information officer to abide by the Army's published FOIA procedures. Indeed,
the court stated that "the Privacy Act does not provide a civil remedy for a violation of regulations
promulgated under the FOIA." Cochran, 770 F.2d at 958. This way of characterizing the issue
avoids an overly formalistic approach to the Privacy Act's requirements. See id. Yet, the Privacy
Act prohibits an agency from disclosing information unless it falls within a specific exemption. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982). If the term "required under [the FOIA]," 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982)
(emphasis added), is strictly construed, the disclosure in this case did not fall within a Privacy Act
exemption, and presumably violated the Act. Two cases have held that a specific FOIA request is
needed in order for disclosure to fall within the "required under [the FOIA]" exemption of the
Privacy Act: Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and Zeller v. United States,
467 F. Supp. 487, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Cochran court distinguished these decisions:
Those cases involved situations where information was gratuitously disclosed without any
kind of request for the information. In contrast, the media representatives in the present
case had lodged standing oral inquiries for information relating to the Cochran investiga-
tion. Furthermore, the present case involves dissemination of current, newsworthy infor-
mation to members of the press, as opposed to disclosure of stale personal information to
purely private individuals.
Cochran, 770 F.2d at 958 n.14. While these distinctions are certainly meaningful, they do not ad-
dress the question whether the press release was required, rather than merely desirable. It seems
quite clear that had the Army information officer refused to disclose the information on Cochran's
disciplinary proceedings, the press's failure to follow the Army's published FOIA procedures would
defeat any claim of improper withholding advanced by the press requesters. See 5 U.S.C.
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tioned whether current newsworthy information of interest to the
community, such as contained in the press release ... even falls within
the strictures of the Privacy Act. '287 Although it declined to address
that "intriguing" question,288 the court noted that "[p]rompt responses
to requests for information from news media representatives should be
encouraged to eliminate the need for these requesters to invoke the provi-
sions of the FOIA and thereby assist in providing timely information to
the public." 289 If, in order to avoid liability under the Privacy Act, agen-
cies feel compelled to withhold information relating to official miscon-
duct until disclosure is "required under the FOIA," openness in
government is likely to be diminished and responsible disclosure delayed,
if not frustrated.
F. Investigatory Records and the Confidential Source Exemption.
Exemption 7(D) of the FOIA allows an agency to withhold the
identity of a confidential source.290 In 1985, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an agency investigator may
qualify as a "confidential source" within the meaning of exemption
7(D). 291 The Second Circuit also rejected the "potential witness rule"
and held that an employee providing information to the NLRB during
the course of an unfair labor practice investigation is a "confidential
source" even if that employee may be required to serve as a witness at a
subsequent NLRB hearing.292 Finally, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a person reporting unsolicited in-
formation to an agency regarding alleged illegal activities may also be
considered a "confidential source. '293
§ 552(a)(3)(B) (1982) (conditioning agency duty to disclose on a request "made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed").
287. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 959 n.15. The case may be read as holding that, even if disclosure was
not required by the FOIA, the plaintiff had not established the requisite injury to prevail under the
Privacy Act. The court noted that "appellant has suffered no 'adverse effect' " as required under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1982). Cochran, 770 F.2d at 958.
288. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 959 n.15. Such a holding would recognize that those who abuse the
public trust have no protectible privacy interest in information detailing the circumstances of such a
breach. As the Cochran court noted: "The legislative history of the [Privacy] Act does not evidence
any intent to prevent the disclosure by the government to the press of current, newsworthy informa-
tion of importance and interest to a large number of people." Id.
289. Id. at 957 n.11 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 518.2(a) (1984)) (emphasis added). The quotation
comes from a provision in Army regulations that was promulgated after the commencement of the
instant case.
290. 5 U.S.C. § 5520,)(7)(D) (1982).
291. See infra notes 294-309 and accompanying text.
292. See infra notes 310-17 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 318-30 and accompanying text.
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1. Agency Personnel and Confidential Source Protection. The leg-
islative history of exemption 7(D) 2 94 and the relevant case law295 indicate
that the term "confidential source" may be applied to a variety of sources
from which an agency derives information relevant to law enforcement
investigations. A person is considered, a confidential source if the with-
holding agency gave "an express or implied assurance of confidentiality"
in return for information.296 In 1985, inKuzma v. IRS, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that even agency personnel
may be considered confidential sources if they receive such assurances. 297
In Kuzma, the IRS refused to disclose to the plaintiff records related
to the agency's investigation of the plaintiff's compliance with the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.298 According to agency affidavits, the plaintiff was a
member of a "protest tax movement" that had engaged in a campaign of
harassment and threats aimed at IRS employees. 299 Under these circum-
stances, the trial court agreed to review in camera IRS affidavits support-
ing the agency's decision to withhold and containing the names of IRS
agents. 30o
The court of appeals, addressing the exemption 7(D) claim, defined
294. See S. RP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6285, 6291 ("The substitution of the term 'confidential source' in section 552(b)(7)(D) is to
make clear that the identity of a person other than a paid informer may be protected if the person
provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which
an assurance could be reasonably inferred.").
295. For example, the courts have held the term "confidential source" to include state and local
law enforcement agencies, see Kimberlin v. Department of the Treasury, 774 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir.
1985); inmates and state prison officials, see Parton v. Department of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 775-77
(8th Cir. 1984); foreign law enforcement agencies, see Founding Church of Scientology v. Regan,
670 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 976 (1982); commercial or financial
institutions, see Biberman v. FBI, 528 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); and "indirect confiden-
tial sources," i.e., persons receiving assurance from one agency that in turn supplies the information
to the withholding agency, see Sands v. Murphy, 633 F.2d 968, 970 (1st Cir. 1980). See also infra
note 301 and accompanying text. But see Ferguson v. Kelley, 448 F. Supp. 919, 925 (N.D. Ill, 1977)
(term "confidential source" applies only to persons providing information); Katz v. Department of
Justice, 498 F. Supp. 177, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (exemption 7 not applicable to state and local organi-
zations other than law enforcement agencies).
296. See supra note 294.
297. Kuzma v. IRS, 775 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
298. Id. at 67-68.
299. Id. at 68.
300. Id. at 68-69. The trial court held that in camera affidavits were appropriate because of the
necessity of protecting the identities of the IRS agents. The court of appeals noted:
If the [trial] court had insisted that the information contained in [the] affidavit , . .be
submitted publicly or not at all, it would have defeated the purpose for which the further
showing was initially requested; obviously, the court would have forced the IRS to disclose
the identities of some of its agents before it determined whether identities of IRS agents
should be shielded from disclosure.
IL at 69.
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a "source" to include "[t]hat from which anything comes forth. 301
Finding that agency personnel fell within this definition, the court then
inquired whether the IRS agents had been given express or implied assur-
ances of confidentiality.30 2 Concluding without discussion that such as-
surances had been given,303 the court held that the records were exempt
from disclosure under exemption 7(D).304
The decision in Kuzma represents a broad interpretation of exemp-
tion 7(D). The purpose of the exemption is to ensure that those who
provide information to an agency will be protected 305 and "that law en-
forcement agencies [will] not be faced with a 'drying up' of their sources
of information or have their criminal investigative work be seriously im-
paired. ' 30 6 Agency personnel receive explicit protection from improvi-
dent disclosure under exemption 7(F). 30 7 Applying exemption 7(D)-
rather than the 7(F) exemption-to information provided by agency per-
sonnel has an important consequence. Under exemption 7(D), once it is
established that information was provided by a confidential source and
that this information was compiled for criminal law enforcement or na-
tional security investigations, the information provided by the source, as
well as the source's identity, may be withheld.30 s By contrast, exemption
7(F) only protects the informant's identity; it does not necessarily ex-
301. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting




304. Id. at 69-70.
305. See id. at 68; Brant Constr. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1262 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
the need for a "'robust' 7(D) exemption" to prevent retaliation against sources).
306. Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
307. Exemption 7 provides that "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes"
may be withheld, "to the extent that the production of such records would ... endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982).
308. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982); S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6291; Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472,
492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (if information is supplied by confidential source during course of a criminal
investigation all such information provided by source is confidential).
Exemption 7(D) protects
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that
the production of such records would ... disclose the identity of a confidential source and,
in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source.
5 U.S.C. § 552@b)(7)(D) (1982).
The courts have held that this exemption protects all confidential information provided by a
confidential source, regardless of whether the information may tend to reveal the source's identity.
See, eg., Radowich v. United States Attorney, 658 F.2d 957, 964 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Congress [in-
tended] to cast a veil of protection over all information furnished by a confidential source."); Duffin
v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("A plain reading of the statute indicates that confi-
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elude the information that the confidential source has provided.30 9 Thus,
the decision in Kuzma expands the scope of permissible agency with-
holding beyond that which the language of statute, taken as a whole,
would apparently allow.
2. The Potential Witness Rule. In a 1985 decision, United Tech-
nologies Corp. v. NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that "the proper interpretation of the term 'confidential
source' includes an informant who is promised or reasonably expects
confidentiality unless and until the agency needs to call him as a witness
at trial. ' 310 In United Technologies, an employee of the plaintiff corpora-
tion gave an NLRB agent some corporate documents that the employee
had acquired without the plaintiff's consent. Upon discovering the na-
ture of these documents, the agent returned them to the employee, ex-
plaining the seriousness of possessing such documents without the
corporation's approval. 311 After the union withdrew the unfair labor
practice charge, United Technologies sought records from the NLRB
that would reveal the identities of the employee who had provided the
tainted documents and the agent who had received them.312 The NLRB
refused to disclose this information on the basis of exemption 7(D).313
United Technologies argued that an employee-informant may not be
considered a confidential source if that employee was a potential witness
in subsequent NLRB proceedings.314 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, reading exemption 7(D) in "practical" terms and giving it a
construction "that reflects the realities of the agencies' law enforcement
capabilities. ' 31 5 Without assurances of confidentiality, the court rea-
soned, employees would be hesitant to provide information about the un-
fair labor practices of their employer to the NLRB out of fear of
retaliation.31 6 Because the exemption was designed to protect those who
provide information to agencies, "[a] person who is otherwise a 'confi-
dential source' should not lose that status simply because he could have
dential information furnished only by a confidential source need not divulge the 'identity' of the
confidential source in order to be protected from disclosure.").
309. Exemption 7(F) only exempts information tending to "endanger the life or physical safety
of law enforcement personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (1982). For this exemption to apply, the
information apparently must tend to identify the law enforcement personnel who supplies it.
310. United Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1985).
311. Id. at 92.
312. Id
313. Id.
314. Id at 94.
315. Id at 95.
316. I.d at 94-95.
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been called or might yet be called as a witness. '317
3. Confidentiality and Unsolicited Information. In Brant Con-
struction Co. v. EPA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that there may be an implicit assurance of confidentiality
when individuals provide unsolicited information to an agency.318 Such
a person may therefore be a "confidential source" under exemption 7(D)
if the court finds, based on the type of information submitted and the
"surrounding circumstances," that "the communication in all likelihood
would not have been made if confidentiality had not been assured." 319
In Brant the EPA received three unsolicited letters from a minority
firm acting as subcontractor on an EPA-funded construction project su-
pervised by the plaintiff.320 These letters alleged that the plaintiff had
attempted to fix bids and solicit firms to act as a minority front for a
"white firm" on federally funded projects.321 The plaintiff filed a FOIA
request for these letters, apparently after the EPA stopped funding its
project.322 The EPA refused to disclose the letters, invoking exemption
7(D).323
The court of appeals viewed solicited information as different in
kind from unsolicited information, and found that different standards of
proof were therefore appropriate in determining whether an assurance of
confidentiality was implicit.324 "Nonetheless," the court held, "formalis-
tic barriers to the protection of confidential sources would defeat the pur-
pose of 7(D), as it is beyond dispute that unsolicited information is vitally
important to law enforcement efforts. ' 325 The court then adopted a two-
part test to determine whether a source of agency information may be
considered confidential. Under this approach, the court must first deter-
mine whether a request for confidentiality was implicit-whether, "in
light of the information and surrounding circumstances, the communica-
tion in all likelihood would not have been made if confidentiality had not
been assured. '326 Secondly, the reviewing court must determine whether
317. Id. at 95.
318. Brant Constr. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1985).
319. Id. at 1264.
320. Id. at 1260.
321. Id. at 1260-61.
322. Id. at 1260.
323. Id. at 1261.
324. Id. at 1263. The court noted that when an agency actively solicits information during a
criminal investigation, assurances of confidentiality are "inherently implicit." Id. For a discussion
of the conflicting standards of confidentiality under exemption 7, see Note, Developments-1984,
supra note 2, at 769-74.
325. Brant, 778 F.2d at 1263.
326. Id. at 1264.
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the information has been treated confidentially by the withholding
agency.327
The Brant court found that the first prong of this test was satisfied
"[i]n view of [the submitters'] subordinate position as subcontractors on
the project and the concern expressed for retaliation." 328 The court
found that the second prong was satisfied by the EPA's assertions that
the agency affords sources of information an "implied confidential rela-
tionship" and the absence of any evidence to the contrary in the rec-
ord.329 As a result, the agency's decision to withhold the letters was
upheld. 330
The 1985 decisions under exemption 7(D) illustrate the range of in-
formation that may be withheld by an agency invoking the exemption's
protection. By expanding that range to include agency personnel, poten-
tial witnesses, and, although perhaps less significantly, unsolicited infor-
mation, these decisions also illustrate the difficulty of confining the
exemption to narrow, predetermined categories. Thus, the usefulness of
distinctions between potential witnesses and non-witnesses, agency and
non-agency personnel, and solicited and unsolicited information depends
on the nature of the information provided to the agency. In each of the
1985 decisions, the source protected by the agency faced the possibility of
retaliation if the source's identity were revealed. In those circumstances,
it would seem, courts will uphold an agency's decision not to disclose a
source's identity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1985, despite the persistent efforts of Senator Hatch, Congress
did not produce any significant amendment of the FOIA. Most reform
proposals focused on amending the fee structure and fee waiver provi-
sions and on enhancing the protection of sensitive business information.
Some progress was seen in the latter area with the passage of the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act.
327. Id. The plaintiff in this case also argued that the EPA was not a "criminal law enforcement
authority." The court noted: "Exemption 7(D) does not state that the agency from whom the
records are requested must also be the criminal law enforcement authority that compiles the dis-
puted record." The fact that the records were forwarded to the EPA's Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral and to the FBI was sufficient to draw the records within the exemption's protection. Id. at
1265.
328. Id. at 1264. The district court had characterized the sources' fear of retaliation in this case
as "a flight of fancy." The court of appeals held that "[t]he question is not whether the fear was
well-founded .... The dispositive point is that the [source] express[ed] a fear of reprisal, which
firmly supports a request for confidentiality." Id.
329. Id.
330. Id at 1265-66.
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Congress expanded the reach of the FOIA by subjecting the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy to the FOIA's provisions. Proposals
were introduced to diminish the delays in processing FOIA requests at
the Consumer Products Safety Commission and to correct the inhibiting
effects of existing computer crime legislation.
Administrative activity reflected the same concerns that motivated
congressional reform proposals. The OMB issued a policy statement to
federal agencies calling for cost-effective implementation of the FOIA
and stressing reliance on private enterprise to provide the public with
information. The report issued by the President's Commission on Indus-
trial Competitiveness provides forceful and politically attractive argu-
ments for restricting access to business information.
In the courts, the Supreme Court expanded permissible exemption 3
withholding by the CIA in a manner that may virtually exempt the
agency from FOIA coverage, and, in the lower federal courts, the "sole
function" test definition of "agency" provided by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit resulted in the exclusion of the Council of Economic Advisers
from the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA. New points
of emphasis may be emerging for the protection of business information,
and the courts seem ready to abandon any restrictive reading of the com-
mercial and financial records exemption. The courts were also willing,
however, to restrain the expansive pressure of United States v. Weber
Aircraft Corp. on the agency memoranda exemption.
Reverse-FOIA cases continued to arise in a variety of circumstances
and to receive varied analytical treatment. While former President
Nixon forced an exception to FOIA coverage by interposing the Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, the Privacy Act
proved insufficient to enjoin agency disclosure of information relating to
an official's violation of the public trust.
Finally, the federal courts of appeals gave liberal interpretations to
the investigatory records exemption for "confidential sources," exempt-
ing the identity and information provided by agency personnel and po-
tential witnesses. In the case of unsolicited information, the Seventh
Circuit rejected any "formalistic" reading of the exemption and held that
such information may receive the exemption's protection.
Lawrence J. Goode and Douglas R. Williams
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